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Ill the Supretne Court of the 
State of Utah 
EMIL J. JACOBSON and DAISY T. 
JACOBSON, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
GEORGE W. SWAN AND LEONA 
SWAN, his wife, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
CASE 
NO. 8050 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of so called facts contained in appellants' 
brief is so limited in its scope that in our view much of the 
evidence of controlling importance is omitted therefrom. 
We are unable to agree that appellants' statement sets forth 
all of the controlling and important terms of the three 
agreements, Plaintiffs' Exhibits F-G and H. These are the 
same documents referred to in the pleadings and memoran-
dums and Findings and Conclusions of the court as Exhibit 
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A, the Uniform Real Estate Contract; Exhibit B, the first 
lease, dated ApriL __ , 1949; and Exhibit C, the second 
lease, dated June 27, 1950. We shall refer to them herein 
respectively as real estate contract, first lease, and second 
lease. 
There are also some statements made by appellants 
with which we do not agree. On page 4 of appellant's brief 
the statement is made that by March, 1949, appellants had 
become in arrears in payments and that the amount was 
disputed. The appellants were in arrears at that time, and 
the amount of the delinquency was not disputed. It was 
$889.41, including contract payments, taxes, insurance and 
water assessments. The Complaint alleges it (R. 6, par. 11). 
Exhibit B (Plaintiffs' Exhibit G) attached to the Complaint 
in paragraphs 2(a) and 2(b) thereof (R. 14), which was 
signed by all the parties to this action, recites that said 
amount of $889.41 represented the total amount due by the 
lessees under said Uniform Real Estate Contract attached 
thereto, but not paid. Defendants in their Answer admit 
that they did not make payments strictly in conformance 
with the provisions as set forth in said real estate contract 
(R. 19, par. 6). The court, in its Memorandum !Decision of 
February 21, 1953, found that amount unpaid at said time 
on the real estate contract (R. 39, second paragraph, R. 45). 
The court so found in its Findings of Fact, (R. 95, par. 6) 
(R. 98, par. 19). (Emil J. Jacobson' Deposition, page 20, 
lines 5-10). (George Swan's Deposition, page 5, lines 5-25). 
In quoting from these depositions we should make it 
clear that the four depositions of the parties hereto have 
been published and are a part of the record in this cause 
(R. 70). (R. 93). 
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We are unable to follow appellants' statement on page 
13 of their brief, concerning the amount paid of $4687.41 
and the $3287.41 there mentioned. On the same page (R. 
71) on the second line should we think read (R. 81). 
In order to determine the questions raised in this mat-
ter, we shall direct the attention of the Court to additional 
evidence which we consider substantial and important. 
The property involved is 1.20 acres of land in Orem, 
Utah, with a house thereon and Y2 share of Provo Bench 
water. 
In June, 1947, said property was listed for sale with 
Dixon Real Estate Company of Provo (R. 94). Respond-
ent, Emil J. Jacobson, at that time a salesman for said com-
pany, was contacted by Swans about the place, and showed 
the property to appellants for the purpose of selling it to 
them (R. 94). (Emil Jacobson's Deposition, page 4, lines 
16-18). Appellants sought to purchase said property for 
the sum of $14,000.00, and agreed to pay as a down pay-
ment the sum of $6000.00, in accordance with the listing 
agreement between Dixon Real Estate Company and one 
P. K. Nielson, then owner thereof. The appellants were un-
able to consummate the purchase of the premises ·upon the 
listing terms, but could and did pay to Dixon Real Estate 
Company, agent of the seller, the sum of $4000.00 (R. 94). 
(Emil Jacobson's Deposition, pages 8-9). R. 32-33). Niel-
son had gone so far with a deal on a farm in Idaho that 
Jacobson felt obliged to help Nielson out, so he finally con-
sented to pay and did pay Nielson $10,000.00 instead of 
$8,000.00 and had the property deeded to Jacobsons and 
sold it to Swans on a contract of sale (R. 33-35). R. 94-95). 
P. K. Nielson conveyed the property to respondents by 
Warranty Deed; and on June 27, 1947, respondents entered 
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into the Uniform Real Estate Contract with Swans and sold 
the property to Swans (Plaintiffs' Exhibit F). (R. 95). Mr. 
Jacobson got $385.00, one-half the usual commission for 
selling the property (Emil Jacobson's Deposition, page 17). 
At that time Swans entered into possession of said 
premises and remained in possession thereof continuously 
until April 11, 1953, a period of almost six years (R. 95). 
(R. 104). 
Although Jacobsons did not receive the $4000.00 down 
payment on the real estate contract, the contract recited a 
total purchase price of $14,000.00, and the receipt of $4000.-
00 was therein acknowledged, but said $4000.00 was paid 
by Swans to Dixon Real Estate Company, and that com-
pany paid it toP. K. Nielson (R. 94-95). Nielson therefore 
received $14,000.00 cash for the property from Jacobsons 
and Swans and stepped out of the picture leaving Jacobsons 
in the position of a seller who now has to buy the property 
back according to the lower court's decision. There was no 
profit in the sale as far as Jacobsons are concerned. 
The real estate contnwt provided for payments of $80.00 
per month, with interest on the unpaid balance at the rate 
of five per cent per annum, payable monthly, said payments 
to apply first on interest and second on principal. It also 
provides that the seller has the option to get a loan on the 
property for not to exceed the unpaid balance of the con-
tract at an interest rate of not to exceed five per cent per 
annum. Buyer agrees to pay all general taxes, insurance 
and assessments. It also provides for forfeiture of all pay-
ments made as liquidated da.ma.ge in case of default, and 
that time is the essence of said a~ment, and for all costs 
and expenses that may arise from enforcing said agreement, 
including a reasonable attorney's fee (Plaintiffs' Exhibit F). 
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Shortly after the execution of the real estate contract 
Jacobsens obtained a loan of $5000.00 from Beneficial Life 
Insurance Company, bearing interest at five per cent per 
annum, payable in monthly installments of $39.55 per 
month, and Jacobsons have been paying on the mortgage 
given to secure that loan ever since they obtained the loan, 
and there is still a balance due thereon of $3800.00 (R. 95). 
{Emil Jacobson's Deposition, pages 19-20). Swans lmew, · 
or should have knewn, that this loan was made as the Bene-
ficial Life Insuran·ce Company's appraisers went to the 
premises with full knowledge of the defendants and ap-
praised the property, and Swans didn't question the purpose 
for which it was being appraised (R. 38). George Swan's 
Deposition, page 4, lines 12-17). ·Out of the $80.00 monthly 
payments, therefore, Jacobsons had to pay $39.55 each 
month to the mortgagee and pay in addition thereto the 
general taxes of approximately $100.00 per year, fire in-
surance premium of $26.00 each year ($78.00 each three 
years), and $3.16 each year on water assessments ($9.50 
for three years) . R. 97, par. 12) . (Emil J acobson'.s Depo-
sition, page 23). Calculated on a monthly basis, the Jacob-
sons had to pay the following amounts per month to keep 
their loan in good standing: $39.55 monthly payment on 
loan; $8.33 on taxes; $2.16 on fire insurance, and $.26 on 
water assessment, a total of $50.30 per month. Mr. Jacob-
son testified that the defendants have been continuously in 
default for the past twenty month period, and that their 
.average payments only amounted to fifty dollars per month 
and they have never been up to date with their contnw18. 
(Emil Jacobson's Deposition, page 24, lines 16-29). 
In March, 1949, the Swans were delinquent in the sum 
of $889.41. From June 27, 1947, to April, 1949, less than 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 years, Swans had not paid the monthly installments on the 
first day of each month as provided in the real estate con .. 
tract, and failed to pay the taxes, insurance premiums, as-
sessments, and installments due for ~December, 1947, June, 
July, August, 1948, and the first four months of the year 
1949, a total of eight months missed out of 22 months, and 
Jacobsons during all this time were obligated to pay $50.30 
per month on the loan (R. 95, par. 6). (Plaintiffs' Exhibits 
B and J). (Defendants' Exhibit 2). This delinquency is 
admitted by Swans (Plaintiffs' Exhibit G). R. 6, par. 11). 
( R. 19, par. 6). (George Swan's Deposition, page 5). The 
delinquent taxes for 1948 and 1949 of $209.41, and fire in-
surance premiums of $78.00 were not paid until June 7, 
1950, total sum being $287.41 (R. 81). (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 
B). On March 11, 1949, Jacobsons served Swans with a 
Notice to Quit (R. 95). 
In April, 1949 the first lease, plaintiffs' Exhibit G, was 
drawn up by Attorney Clyde Sandgren. Swans and Jacob-
sons met with the attorney and executed this lease. They 
read it over and fully understood it (George Swan's Depo-
sition, pages 5-6 and 16). (Leona Swan's Deposition, pages 
2-3). (Daisy Jacobson's Deposition, pages 4-5-6-7-8). 
(Emil Jacobson's Deposition, page 16). It was understood 
and agreed that any interest Swans had in the real estate 
contract was cancelled and completely terminated by the 
execution of the first lease, and that the first lease was sub-
stituted in its place, and that if the lease was performed ac-
cording to its terms then Swans would have a right to en-
ter into a new contract with Jacobsons for the purchase of 
the property, but if Swans defaulted in the performance of 
the terms of said lease, then the Jacobsons would have the 
right to remove the Swans from possession as tenants at 
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will. (Plaintiffs' Exhibit G). (Emil Jacobson's Deposition, 
page 20, line 11 et seq). {R. 95-96). Daisy Jacobson's De-
position, pages 4-5-6-7). {Leona Swan's Deposition, pages 
2-3). (George Swan's Deposition, pages 5-7). We think 
the court's analysis and findings insofar as they pertain to 
the matter of the mutual termination of the real estate con-
tract by the two leases is well stated in the· Memorandum De-
cision of February 21, 1953, and we therefore call the Court's 
attention to it (R. pages 39 to 47). (R. 98-99, par. 2). We 
do not agree with the lower court, of course, on the ques-
tions of penalty and the disallowance of attorney's fees. 
The first lease makes it very clear that the status of 
the parties was completely ·changed from that of seller and 
buyer to lessor and lessee. Note the language of the lease 
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit G). It uses this kind of language: 
Agreement--by and between Emil J. Jacobson--here-
in called lessors and George W. Swan--herein called Ies-
Stees. In second paragraph the use of the word "were" in-
dicating that they are not now purchasing but were to pur-
chase the property, the word "were" being in the past tense. 
In third paragraph - admission of default and that lessors 
by right constituted the lessees their tenants at will, and 
lessees acknowledge that they are at this time merely ten-
ants at will. In fourth paragraph lessors are willing to al-
low lessees to remain in possession on a month to month 
basis for a period not to exceed one year from date on the 
terms set out in the lease. In paragraph 1 the lease is on 
a month to month basis ~nding no later than April 30, 1950. 
Note the use of the term rental on the amount of payments 
and credit on the already accrued and past due obligation 
of $889.41 under the real estate contract not paid. The 
lease is specifi·c and definite in all its terms - that rent 
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8 
shall be $80.00 per month and $20.00 on the accrued debt, 
a total of $100.00 per month. The lease does not provide 
a lump sum of rent in gross, but only from month to month. 
If performance is faithfully made at the times they are d~, 
lessors will make a new contract in similar form as the old 
and give full credit for all payments made. The purpose of 
the lease is to allow the lessees a reasonable QPportonity to 
r~instate their right ~ purchase said property but at the 
same time to preserve the lessors' right to remove the les-
sees from possession as tenants at will in the event the lat-
ter do not perform the terms of the lease. The next para-
graph provides for payment of a reasonable attorneys fee 
in case of default that may arise from enforcing said agree-
ment. 
The court in deciding the questions of whether or not 
the two leases constituted mere extensions and modifica-
tions of the real estate contract whereby strict performance 
. . . . is waived . . . . that Swans have made 
substantial performance thereunder and are not therefore 
in default under said contract, held against Swans on that 
defense and said in part, referring to the first lease: "No 
language could be clearer as to the termination as a con-
tract between the parties of Exhibit "A". Exhibit "B" was 
thus a new agreement, which constituted a month to month 
contingent tenancy, with a granted right to the defendants, 
upon their payment of certain amounts "at the times they 
are due," to "enter into a new real estate contract with the 
lessees in similar form to Exhibit "A" . . . . "It would 
be imposing terms upon the parties which they had at the 
time no thought of entering into to hold that "B" was a wai-
ver of the terms of "A", or that it was an extension thereof, 
It was a new agreement which adopted no tenns of the old, 
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is complete and entire in itself, and refers to the old one 
only for the purpose of fixing the considerations for the 
new." (R. 45). The court found that Swans defaulted un-
der said first lease in the sum of $287.41 and said first lease 
expired on April 30, 1950 (R. 81, 96), and that the $287.41 
was paid on June 7, 1950 (R. 81). We do not agree with 
the court's finding that the amount of said default was 
$287.41, and we will argue this matter under point one of 
our cross appeal. There was no written agreement so far 
as we can determine existing between the parties from Ap-
ril 30, 1950, until June 27, 1950. On June 27, 1950, the par-
ties entered into the second lease agreement, whereby 
Swans continued in possession of the premises on the terms 
and conditions contained in that lease (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 
H). (R. 96). This lease, the court held, was quite similar 
to the first lease, and it is likewise a complete new agree-
ment, referring to "A" and "B" only for the purpose of pro-
viding a contingent right for Swans to have a new contract 
of purchase (R. 46). Swans in the second lease acknowl-
edged that they were in default in making the payments un-
der the real estate contract and that Jacobsons pursuant 
to the right therein granted to them, constituted Swans ten-
ants at will, and "the lessees hereby acknowledge that they 
are at this time merely tenants at will." Swans also admit 
that they were allowed by Jacobsons to remain in posses-
sion of said property on a month to month basis until April 
.30, 1950 under the terms set forth in the first lease dated 
April, 1949. Swans further admit that they failed to per-
form pursuant to the first lease, but that the lessors are 
willing to allow the lessees to remain in possession of said 
property on a month to month basis until August 31, 1950, 
on payment of $300.00 by that date, and if that term is com-
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plied with, then on a month to month basis for a period not 
to ex~ 3 years from date on the terms and conditions set 
forth in the second lease. The second lease then provides 
that the lessors lease to the lessees on a month to month 
basis for a period commencing June 1, 1950, and ending Au-
gust 31, 1950 the said property. The lease says that if 
Swans fail to pay the $300.00 on or before August 31, 1950, 
they will surrender to lessors on September 1, 1950, the 
possession of said property and that the~after they will 
have no interest in or right to said property and that they 
will have no claim or claims of any kind against the lessors 
for any reason whatsoever. The lease further states that 
if the $300.00 is paid when due that only in that event, the 
lessors "hereby lease to the lessees on a month to month 
basis for a period commencing September 1, 1950 and end-
ing May 31, 1953" the said property. The lease then says 
that in the event the lessees become ·month to month tenants 
commencing September 1, 1950, as therein provided, they 
agree to pay $100.00 a month on the first day of each month 
during said three year period, and in addition all insurance 
premiums, taxes, assessments, relating to said property 
during the period of their tenancy. It is further provided 
that in the event the lessess shall pay the said amounts at 
the times they are due respectively, the lessors agree to en-
ter into a new real estate sales contract with the lessees in 
similar form to the one attached to the lease and give credit 
for all amounts paid on t~ principal on the real estat con-
tract, the first lease and the second lease. The lease then 
sets forth the purpose of the contract as follows, "It is 
agreed by and between the parties hereto that the purpose 
of this contract is to allow the lessees a reasonable oppor-
tunity to reinstate their right to purchase said property 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
but at the same time to preserve the lessors' right to re-
move the lessees from possession as tenants at will in the 
e\rent the lessees do not peform according to the terms of 
this contract." The lease then says that the lessees agree 
to deliver up the premises at the expiration of the term in 
as good order and condition as when the same were entered 
upon by lessees, reasonable use and wear thereof and dam-
age by the elements excepted, and that lesse·es will not un-
derlet said premises, without the written consent of lessors 
first obtained. The lessees agree that if the rent, or any 
part thereof, shall be unpaid for 15 days after the same shall 
become due, or if default be made in any of the covenants 
therein contained to be kept by the lessees . . . ., it 
shall and may be lawful for lessors . . . . without no-
tice or legal process, to re-enter and take possession of said 
premises and relet the same and apply the net proceeds so 
received upon the amount due under this lease. The les-
sees agree to pay all ·water rates, plumbing bills, gas and 
electric light charges, and each agrees to pay costs and rea-
sonable attorneys fees that may arise from enforcing said 
agreement. The provisions were made binding upon the 
heirs, personal representatives and assigns of the parties. 
The intention of the parties, we think, is important in 
construing the three agreements. Daisy Jacobson, on page 
2 of her deposition, said that when they bought the prop-
erty they didn't buy it to live in or to rent, but to secure 
the payment of the money they had invested in the prop-
erty. She further stated that it was her understanding that 
when the leases were made, the Jacobsons could not force 
Swans to abide by the terms of the original real estate con-
tract. That the extent of Swans liability as reflected in the 
leases was only that Swans would lease the property from 
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Jacobsons for the period of time designated in the leases; 
that if Swans did perform those leases and keep up their 
rent that they would have the right to have a new contract 
made for the purchase of the property. But that Jacobsons 
could not force Swans to enter into a new contract if they 
didn't want to, and that if Swans violated the leases that 
Jacobsons were to have possession of the property free from 
all rights of Swans therein and thereto, and Swans were to 
vacate the premises and let Jacobsons have the property 
and the real estate contract was cancelled and the property 
leased to Swans. (Daisy Jacobson's Deposition, pages 4 to 
8). Mrs. Leona Swan, in her deposition, on pages 2 and 3, 
said that she signed the real estate contract and the two 
leases and understood them; that she had known that the 
delinquency existed in respect to this matter ever since 
Swans made the contract, and so in order to defi¥ their 
rights after the original contract was breached, they en-
tered into the first lease and later the second lease. 
Emil Jacobson in his deposition, on page 20, testified 
that in April, 1949, Swans were delinquent $889.41; that 
the first lease was prepared in April, 1949; that the matter 
was discussed by Mr. Jacobson and Mr. Swan and Attorney 
Clyde Sandgren; that at that time it was agreed that the 
contract of sale of real estate was to be terminated, and this 
lease substituted in its place; that if the lease were per-
formed according to its terms then Swans would have the 
right to enter into another new contract with Jacobsons for 
the purchase of the property as indicated in Exhibit B. 
On pages 21 to 24 of Jacobson's deposition, he testified 
that Swans defaulted in the performance of the first lease; 
that in April, 1950, the parties agreed to go into another 
tenant at will lease or contract on a monthly basis; that the 
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lease was executed on June 27, 1950; that it was agreed at 
that time that any interest in the real estate contract, of 
cow-se, was cancelled, and that if the second lease was per-
formed according to its terms, that Swans would then have 
a right to enter into a new contract with Jacobsons; that 
Jacobson was instructed that it was a tenant at will lease, 
on a month to month basis; that was the way it was ex-
plained to him; that Mr. Sandgren, his attorney, prepared 
both leases, and it was Jacobson's understanding that if 
Swans violated the terms of this lease that then they were 
to become tenants at will and were to vacate the premises 
and Jacobsons were to have the right to the property free 
and clear of whatever contract of sale of real estate which 
is referred to as Exhibit A in the Complaint; that Swans 
defaulted in the performance of the second lease as follows: 
November 1, 1950, the installment of $100.00; January 1, 
1951--$100.00; January 1, 1952--$100.00; and from March, 
1952, until December inclusive it amounts to about $1000.00 
of unpaid payments-a total delinquency of unpaid pay-
ments as of December 1, 1952, of $1,300.00. In addition, 
$311.58 for 1950-51-52 taxes, and $78.00 fire insurance pre-
miums, and $9.50 water assessment, all of which Swans 
agreed to pay under the second lease. That in addition 
Jacobson has paid his attorney, Clyde Sandgren, $204.40 
as attorney's fees, in connection with the enforcement of 
the lease, and that Swans have defaulted in all of the agree-
ments, having been continuously in default for the past 
twenty months; and that Swans have never been up to date 
with their contracts. 
Mr. Swan, on pages 4 to 12 of his deposition, testified 
that he executed the real estate contract; that he didn't 
keep up the payments as provided in said contract; that he 
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got behind approximately $889.00; that he executed the 
first lease in Clyde Sandgren's office; that he executed the 
!-'et'ond lease; that when the first lease e~ired Swans were 
delinquent in the paymentof rent provided for in that lease; 
that he paid the $300.00 to be paid under the second lease 
before August 31, 1950; that he became delinquent in the 
payment of the rent under the second lease in February, 
1952; that he has not made any payments on rent since Feb-
ruary, 1952. That he offered to pay the payments to Jac-
obsons through Attorney Sandgren in March, 1952. That 
J acobsons were not present, but Sandgren called them on 
the phone; that he took four hundred and some dollars that 
covered $200.00 delinquent taxes, $100.00 monthly payment, 
$78.00 insurance and $9.00 water bill; that he tendered it 
to Clyde Sandgren. He had the cash with him. Sandgren 
wouldn't accept it. Sandgren called Jacobson on the phone 
and Jacobson he supposed would not accept it; this was the 
day after he got a notice to quit; that he has made several 
approaches since then to have it refinanced and pay it off, 
but they couldn't agree on the amount owing. Swan then 
testified as follows: Q. "Well, did you make any offer to 
pay the rent after March, 1952?" A. "Well, we made an 
offer to pay off the entire contract, inasmuch as we had 
failed the first time we supposed Mr. Jacobson no longer 
wished that sort of thing, so we tried to take over the entire 
contract and reimburse Mr. Jacobson for all that was ow-
ing him, but we couldn't come to a decision as to the right 
amount for it" (George Swan's Deposition, page 10). Ap-
pellants, on page 8 of their brief, say, "Of course, nothing 
further was paid . . . . " Why not? 
Swan then testified that he tried to get a loan from 
Clair Mortenson, but only for $8,400.00, in October, 1952.· 
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That he tried the First Security Bank, but the loan was 
turned down in April, 1952 (Swan's Deposition, pages 12, 
16). That Tom Stubbs offered to take over the delinquency 
in the contract and reimburse them at the rate of $200.00 
a month. That their offer was made through Clyde Sand-
gren, by Ray !vie, Swan's attorney. That he was not pres-
ent, so he doesn't know whether there was a tender of any 
money. Swan then testified, on page 13 of his deposition, 
as follows: Q. "Now do you know of any other offers to 
pay this rent or to pay off the entire contract as you call 
it?" A. "No I don't think there were. We had several in 
the making, and I believe they were the only ones that 
were." 
Swan then testified, on page 13 of his deposition, that 
he was served with three Notices to Quit- one in March, 
1949, one in March, 1952, and one in August, 1952. 
In concluding the matter as to the ability of Mr. Swan 
to raise the amounts actually due Mr. Jacobson, Mr. Swan 
was asked if he could raise enough money to pay the 
amounts set out on page 19 of Swan's deposition - and his 
reply was that he had never received any commitment that 
he could borrow that amount of money on this property and 
pay Mr. Jacobson off if he were willing to accept it. 
Mrs. Swan testified, on pages 3 and 4 of her deposition, 
that they had talked about trying to negotiate a loan to 
pay Mr. Jacobson off -if he were willing to accept it, but that 
they haven't yet received anything definite as to an amount, 
so far as she knew. 
Emil Jacobson testified on pages 15 and 16 of his dep-
osition that he was never told by Attorney Sandgren or At-
torney Morgan that Swans were willing to go ahead and pay 
on the contract. That what Swans were doing was just a 
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stall, which it turned out to be. No offer was made to either 
pay up the delinquent rent or pay off the contract. On pages 
25 to 27 of Mr. Jacobson's deposition he testifies that as of 
December 23, 1952, the date of his deposition, he had never 
been tendered any money in connection with paying up on 
the second lease or the original real estate contract. That 
the First Security Bank had turned Swan's application for 
a loan down because of Swan's credit rating, through judg-
ments and other ratings, wasn't good and they wouldn't loan 
enough. That Clair Mortenson told Jacobson he would not 
make the loan and turned it down. That other institutions 
contacted appraised the property at $10,000.00 or $11,000.-
00 .. 
The court in its Memorandum Decision (R. 28) found 
against the defendants on the right to rescind the agree-
ments "A'', "B" and "C", and held that the Notice to Quit 
served on August 12, 1952, was good (R. 19-20). 
The court, on the basis of the ruling in Perkins vs. 
Spencer, case 263 P. 2-446, held that the question of penalty 
in this case should be determined; and also the matter of 
whether plaintiffs' attorneys are entitled to any attorneys' 
fees, and if so, how much. The court then reserved issues 
of fact to be submitted to a jury and an issue of law as stat-
ted in appellants brief, page 11 (R. 49-50. The court awar-
ded plaintiffs immediate restitution of the premises, and re-
strained plaintiffs from selling or encumbering the premises 
unless a bond was filed to secure payment of any sums that 
may be adjudged in favor of defendants upon hearing of 
the reserved issues. The court ordered that plaintiffs may 
prepare and present Findings, Conclusions and interlocutory 
decree, subject to restraint or bond and that plaintiffs may 
have a writ restoring plaintiffs to full possession of the 
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premises. The court further ordered that the parties have 
10 days in which to enter any objections or proposals they 
may have in respect to the statement of issues reserved (R. 
49-50). Objections and proposals and motion to hear the 
matter without a jury were filed by plaintiffs and argued 
on March 13, 1953 and all denied (R. 69). No bond was 
filed and no interlocutory papers filed, as the case came on 
for trial before the jury on March 16, 1953 (R 73). The 
court's Memorandum Decision was made February 21st, 
1953, and the respective counsel were given copies thereof. 
We can see no harm to anyone if no interlocutory papers 
were prepared and filed, inasmuch as the case was about 
to be tried in a few days. 
The jury returned its special verdict, finding that un-
der the real estate contract of June 27, 1947, Swan had paid 
$5,060.00, which included the $4,000.00 paid to P. K. Niel-
son. That under the first lease of April, 1949, Swan had 
paid $1727.41, and under the second lease of June 27, 1950, 
Swan paid $1,900.00, the total being $8687.41, over a period 
of about six y~rs. The jury found no damages to the prem-
ises, $14,000.00 to be the value of the property when sold 
to Swans and on September 15, 1952, and found $85.00 per 
month to be the reasonable rental value of the premises dur-
ing period of occupancy by Swans, and $500.00 as a rea-
sonable attorney's fee (R. 63-64). The court adopted the 
findings of the jury and gave judgment in favor of the ap-
pellants in the sum of $331.30, stating in its analysis that 
inasmuch as the court has found in its Memorandum De-
cision that the lease, Exhibit "B", completely terminated 
Exhibit "A", excepting for the purpose of fixing the price 
and terms of a new agreement of purchase, the court finds 
and holds that the penalty or liquidated damages, as urged 
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by the defendants, must be determined in respect to the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract, Exhibit "A", and in view of 
the decision in Perkins vs. Spencer, the court must and does 
hold the paymentB made under Exhibit "A" to be a penaity, 
and that there was a total of $3,190.00 which constituted 
su~ h penalty ( R. 80) . The court set off delinquencies under 
the second lease of $1,328.70 (R. 82-83, 97, 99-100). Also 
$1,530.00 treble damages, leaving a net judgment of $331.30 
to appellants (R. 83 and 100, 101, 105-6). The court also 
denied plaintiffs' attorneys fees (R. 84, 100), but found 
$500.00 to be a reasonable attorneys fee (R. 97). The court 
held the Notice to Quit good (R. 86, 97, 100-101). The 
court found that at no time since March 5, 1952, have the 
defendants offered to the plaintiffs payment of all sums due 
the plaintiffs at that time or since the schedule of payments 
set forth in Exhibits "A", "B", and "C", nor have the de-
fendants offered to refinance the purchase of the property 
for the full amount due the plaintiffs since then (R. 44, 98). 
The court found that plaintiffs performed all the terms of 
said agreements on their part to be performed (R. 98). See 
Mr. Swan's Deposition, page 16, where he admits it. In the 
Conclusions of Law (R. 98-101) the court concluded that 
the real estate contract is not a mortgage. Swans have 
abandoned this theory (page 9 of appellants' brief. That 
the relationship of vendor-purchaser under the real estate 
contract was mutually terminated by agreements of the 
parties, said agreements being the two leases. That from 
April, 1949, to April 30, 1950, Swans were tenants at will 
of Jacobsons. That the first lease expired April 30, 1950. 
That Swans were tenants at will of Jacobsons under the 
second lease until September 15, 1952, and thereafter un-
til March 15, 1952 Swans held the premises unlawfully and 
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were guilty of unlawful detainer for that period of time. 
The court then concludes that the amount of $5060.00 which 
includes the $4000.00 paid Nielson, paid on the real estate 
contract, less the reasonable rental value for the same at 
$85.00 a month, amounting to $1870.00, constitutes a pen-
alty, which penalty is unenforceable, and gives Swans a 
gross credit of $3190.00. The court then concludes that 
J acobsons are entitled to set off the delinquencies accrued 
under the second lease and interest on these delinquencies, 
all amounting to $1328.70, and that $1530.00 should be set 
off as damages for unlawful detainer from September 15, 
1952, to March 15, 1953 at $85.00 per month trebled. That 
$331.30 is the net penalty and the defendants are entitled 
to judgment for that sum. The court then concluded that 
this action is not brought to enforce Exhibits "A", "B", or 
"C" to the Complaint, and that therefore Jacobsons are not 
entitled to any judgment for attorneys fees. The court then 
concludes that Jacobsons are entitled to quiet their title and 
restitution of the premises. Judgment was entered accord-
ingly (R. 105-6) . 
STATEMENT OF POINTS ON CROSS-APPEAL 
Jacobsons have cross appealed, and assign the follow-
ing cross errors (R. 115, 117). (We shall join Points 1 and 
3 (R. 117) under Point One herein). 
POINT ONE 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE 
IS A PENALTY IN THIS CASE ARISING OUT OF EX-
HIIBITS "A", "B", AND "C" ATTACHED TO THE COM-
PLAINT, OR EITHER OF THEM, AND IN_ UIMITING 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
20 
THE AMOUNT OF RECOVERY OF THE PLAINTIFFS, 
AND IN AWARDING DEFENDANTS JUDGMENT 
AGAINST PLAINTI~FS FOR THE SUM OF $331.30 TO-
GE:rHER WITH INTEREST, BECAUSE THE COURT 
HELD, AND RIGHrLY SO, THAT EXHIBIT "A" WAS 
MUTUALLY TERMINATED BY AGREEMENTS OF THE 
PARTIES, EXHIBITS "B" AND "C", AND THEREBY 
THEY MUTUALLY RELEASED AND DISCHARGED 
EACH OTHER FROM ALL OBLIGATIONS ARISING OR 
GROWING OUT OF EXHIBIT "A", BY EXECUTING 
EXHBITS "B" AND "C'', ANlD BY THEREBY ESTAB-
LISHING THE RELA TIONSIITP OF LESSORS AND LES-
SEES, THE LESSEES BECOl\ITNG TENANTS AT WilL 
AND THERE SHOULD HAVE BEEN NO OFFSET, BY 
USING ANY AMOUNTS PAID ON EXlllBIT "A" BY 
SWANS AGAINST THE AMOUNT PLAINTIFF WAS 
ENTITLED TO RECOVER. 
POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
TinS ACTION IS NOT BRO.UGHT TO ENFORCE EITHER 
EXIllBITS ''A'', ''B'', OR ''C'', AND THAT PLAJNri'IFFS 
ARE NOT ENTITLED TO ANY JUDGMENT WHATSO-
EVER FOR A'ITORNEYS FEES. 
ARGUMENT 
We shall first discuss the four points which appellants 
designate in their brief as the basis for their claim that the 
case should be remanded only for the purpose of detennin-
ing the amount of appellants' damages for wrongful ter-
mination of the contract. (See Appellants' Brief, page 34). 
Thereafter we shall discuss the two points on the cross ap-
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peal. At this point we desire to make a few comments 
\vhich we think ought to be mentioned. 
The appellants, under Point Four in their brief, on 
pages 15 and 29-31, say the court erred in finding that ap-
pellants were, at the time of entry of judgment, still detain-
ing the premises unlawfully or detaining them at all. This 
assignment of error we think grows out of Finding of Fact 
No. 15 (R. 97). There is no dispute that Swans surrendered 
possession of the premises on ·April 11, 1953 (R. 104). (R. 
121-122). It is true that the Findings of the court were 
signed on June 11, 1953, but it is also true that the trial of 
the case was concluded on March 18, 1953 (R. 75). And 
counsel argued the case on March 24, 1953 (R. 76), and that 
in paragraph 4 (R. 95) in the same Findings of Fact the 
court finds that the defendants entered into possession of the 
premises on June 27, 1947, and remained in possession 
thereof continuously until March 15, 1953. i Obviously the 
court didn't intend to, and did not say that defendants were 
detaining the premises past the date of March 15, 1953. 
Ho\v could it, when the evidence was all in when the case 
was concluded in March? If it were intended that the court 
should go beyond March 15-then it should have gone 
to the date of Apri111, but it could not do that because that 
eviden·ce was not before it when the case was taken under 
advisement. Plaintiffs are entitled to almost another month 
of treble damages to April11, but that has not been inclu-
dede in this judgment. We think that Point Four has no 
merit. 
Swans do not want the property. They want to com-
pel Jacobsons to buy the property back and refund to them 
all amounts paid above the reasonable rental value. They 
voluntarily surrendered possession on April 11, 1953, hand-
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ing the keys over to Jacobsons (R. 104, 121-122). They 
voluntarily surrendered their lease, if there was a term lease 
as they contend, the same day. They are not asking the 
court to reinstate any of the agreements nor reinstate them 
either as purchasers or as lessees under any of the agree-
ments. They have filed no supersedeas ~bond on appeal, to 
stay the execution of the judgment. They gave up the prop-
erty before the Judgment and Decree were enterd on June 
11, 1953 ( R. 105-6) . They are not asking any relief except 
damages for wrongful termination of the contract. They 
concede that Jacobsons are entitled to reasonable rent of 
$85.00 a month, in their brief, page 31. The only basis of 
damage if there were a wrongful termination would be the 
treble damage, but there was no pleading on damages for 
wrongful termination, and it was not until after all the evi-
dence was in and the case was argued to the court that the 
issue of damages was suggested by defendants, and defend-
ants' counsel asked for permission on March 24, 1953, to file 
an amendment to the affirmative defense in the Answer, 
which amendment was to contain a Counterclaim for dam-
ages for breach of contract - the second lease. The court 
denied the motion (R. 76). They abandoned the mortgage 
theory, as further evidence of abandonment of the property. 
The two leases show also that what Swans wanted was mere-
ly an option to buy the property back without binding them 
to buy it back. Swan could have, and we think he has, and 
has had, reasons why he only wanted to be a lessee of the 
premises with an option to buy. In considering Points One, 
Two, and Three of appellants, we think that appellants have 
little or no merit in these points, as they failed to apply for 
relief under Section 78-36-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
to protect their second lease agreement and also their al-
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leged right to have a new purchase agreement. Appellants 
have argued throughout their brief that they had a lease 
for a definite term and that it ran until May, 1953, and yet 
they failed to apply for relief under that section to preserve 
the balance of that term. Having failed to apply for that 
relief, we submit they have waived it. Conunercial Block 
Realty Company vs. Merchants Protective Association, 71 
Utah 505; 267 P. 1009. If the leases were extensions or 
modifications of the real estate contract, and if the Notices 
to Quit were not proper, and if the tender of sums due was 
made on March 5, 1952 and thereafter, then why didn't ap-
pellants ask for relief under 78-36-10, 1953 U. C. A., and 
get a stay of execution of the judgment, or pay the judg-
ment and be restored to their estate? I,f on the other hand, 
our theory that they were merely tenants at will and that 
there was a mutual termination of the real estate contract 
is correct, then the leases were not extensions or modifica-
tions of the original contract, and the Notices to Quit were 
proper, and the tender of the payments of the amounts due 
on the contracts A, B, and C was ineffectual, as there was 
no real estate contract in existence and the tender, if any 
was ever made for the right amount on the second lease, 
nor was any tender, kept alive. We also submit that there 
was a waiver of any penalty under "A" by the conduct of 
the parties_ in making the two leases and under the testi-
mony and evidence in the case. 
ANSWER TO POINT ONE 
THE TRIA·L CO·URT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING 
TH!AT THE UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT O·F 
JUNE 27, 1947, WAS TERMINATED BY THE LEASES OF 
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APRIL, 1949, AND OF JUNE 27, 1950. THESE IN-
STRJUMENTS WERE NOT IN TRUTH AND FACT :MERE-
LY EXTENSIONS AND MODOFICATIONS OF THE OR-
IGINAL UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT OF 
JUNE 27, 1947, THAT CONTRACT WAS PROPERLY 
AND LAWFULLY TERMINATED, AND THE TRIAL 
COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE GRANTED THE DEFEND-
ANTS (LESSEES) RELIEF FROM ·A :FORFErruRE OF 
SUMS PAID THEREUNDER. 
Respondents contend that his Court should not construe 
the two leases as extensions and modifications of the con-
tract of sale, because there is nothing in the record before 
the Court to show that they were in truth or in fact other 
than what they purport to be on their face. The Memoran-
dum Decision (R. 39-42, 44-45) states the intentions of the 
parties; the leases themselves recite the purpose and mean-
ing of the agreements (R. 14-17); and the depositions of all 
four of the parties state they read and understood the doc-
uments. (George Swan's Deposition, P. 5-6 and 16). (Le-
ona Swan's Deposition, P. 3). Daisy Jacobson's Deposition, 
P. 4-8). Emil Jacobson's Deposition, P. 16). Appellants 
have carried no burden of proof required to establish by 
clear and convincing proof that the relationship was other 
than or different from the provisions upon the face of the 
written instruments executed by the parties. Corey v. Rob-
erts, 82 Utah 445, 25 P. 2nd 940; Brown v. Skeen, 89 Utah 
568, 58 P. 2nd 24. 
Respondents did not agree to sell the property to ap-
pellants in any event by executing the lease agreements. 
The faithful performance of the lease agreement was made 
a condition precedent to the entering of a new contract of 
sale. The sale, then, was to follow the leases and therefore 
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was not embodied as any part of the lease agreements. 
There was no fraud in entering into these lease agreements, 
and there is nothing against public policy in entering into 
them. The leases were inconsistent with the contract of 
sale by providing for a rental to ·be paid in cash every month 
for the use and possession of the premises with the proviso 
that if the payments and taxes were not paid ·at the times 
they were due that the lessors could remove the lessees as 
tenants at will. The lessees had acknowledged that they 
were properly constituted as tenants at will under the con-
tract of sale and were at the time of entering into the lease 
agreements merely tenants at will. Lessees acknowledged 
as well their default of the contract of sale. Any question 
as to proper notice to lessees to terminate their rights under 
the contract of sale would be waived by these acknowledge-
ments and the making of the leases. The case of Pacific 
Development Co. v. Stewart, 113 Utah 403, 195 P. 2nd 748, 
cited on P. 5 of appellants' brief, requiring alternative notice 
if seller by his conduct or words waived strict performance 
of the contract, would therefore not apply. The first lease 
says that if the payment of the rents, taxes, insurance, and 
assessments and the $889.41 delinquency under the contract 
of sale be paid at the times they are due as provided, for a 
certain length of time, on a month to month basis, then les-
sors agree to enter into a new real estate contract giving 
credit on the principal for all amounts paid. 
In comparing these agreements with the contract of 
sale, it will be seen that under the leases, specific perfonn-
ance of the sale of the property is lost to the lessors. The 
lessees do not have to buy the property and would have a 
perfect defense to lessor's suit for specific performance by 
saying, "We have defaulted under the contract of sale and 
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gave up our payments as liquidated damages, and we are 
now merely leasing the property with an option to enter 
into a new contract if we continue with our lease. Even if 
we perform the lease, we do not have to enter into a new 
contract of sale. We did not agree to enter into a new con-
tract; the lessors agreeed to enter into a new contract with 
us if we so desired. The lease is to be construed in our favor 
and strictly against the lessors." 
What if the property had rapidly depreciated or the 
house destroyed by fire? Respondents would be unable to 
enforce the sale against the lessees. If lessees are, under 
the lease agreements, in truth, vendees entitled to credit on 
the contract for everything theretofore paid, then lessees 
have gained powerful prerogatives as a result of their breach 
of contract in the first instance. 
Appellants in their brief, on P. 23, submit that the so-
called leases were intended at the time they were drafted 
as a transparent attempt to avoid the Perkins v. Spencer rule 
of damages. That case was decided in April, 1952, and 
these leases were drafted in 1949 and 1950. The parties in-
the case at bar thought that the forfeiture as liquidated 
damages as provided in the contract of sale was legitimate 
procedure. Appellants now contend that by entering into 
lease agreements, the lessors were plotting how to keep the 
liquidated damages in future years, instead of recognizing 
the leniency of respondents in allowing the appellants an 
opportunity to reinstate their contract with full credit by 
in effect recognizing the harshness of the forfeiture and ap-
plying equitable relief voluntarily. 
The true intention of the parties was to enter into a 
lease with an option to reinstate the original contract. The 
option was self-executing, but it did not mature unless the 
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leases were complied with in full and for the duration there-
of. The puvpose clause in the leases themselves clearly de-
fines the intent of the parties. Appellants were to get a new 
contract only if they performed the leases faithfully; there 
was no assurance that title, legal or equitable, was to pass 
until the parties decided what they wanted to do and come 
to a meeting of the minds upon the completion of the lease 
agreements. The rents had to be paid whether a contract 
of sale was to mature or not, and whether Swan wanted to 
buy or not. 
It is true that lessors could not dispossess lessees as 
long as lessees were not in default. The tenancy was on a 
month to month basis not to exceed one year and three years 
in the respective leases. But it was the option that preven-
ted lessors from terminating the estate of lessees and not 
the incidents of the estate. By the provisions in the leases 
themselves the lessees contracted and agreed to be removed 
as tenants at will ln the event payments were not made 
according to the terms of the lease agreements. This pro-
vision is not at all in conflict with the purpose and incidents 
of the lease, nor is it in conflict with a tenancy for a term 
if one existed. This will be discussed under Answer to Point 
Two. But the term in this instance was included to fix a 
time for the option to mature. 
The leases here involved fit well into the discussion of 
rights and duties pertaining to a lease with option to pur-
chase as found in Tilton v. Sterling Coal and Coke Co., 28 
Utah 1 ~3, 77 P. 758. 
"When an option is given to a lessee to purchase 
the leased premises, the lease is a sufficient considera-
tion to support the option, and the lessor cannot with-
draw it before the time given in which to accept it has 
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expired; but when the time for its acceptance is speci-
fied, the option, as a general rule, unless it is accepted 
at that time, terminates, if no further time be granted. 
While an option to purchase, if based upon a sufficient 
consideration, binds the party granting it, it is not a 
contract of purchase, but simply a contract granting 
to the holder of the option the privilege of purchasing, 
and binds the party by whom it is given to sell and con-
vey the property involved, upon the acceptance of the 
option in accordance with the terms, and the compli-
ance on the part of the acceptor with its requirements. 
There is no contract of purchase, or any obligation to 
sell and convey until the option is accepted and por-
formed, or tender of performance by the holder is made 
in proper time. Until then there is no contract between 
the parties which can be specifically enforced." 
See 55 Am. Jur., page 492, Vendor and Purchaser, un-
der Options, par. 27-31, 39, 40, 43. See 32 Am. Jur., pages 
278-288, Landlord and Tenant, under Option to Purchase, 
paragraphs 299, 300, 301, 302, 305, 308-310, wherein it 
states that the optionee does not become a vendee until the 
option is exercised, and where a failure to pay rent under 
the lease constitutes a failure of consideration for the op-
tion, and where service of notice to quit by lessor for breach 
of the lease terminates the tenant's option to purchase. 
"The fact that if a sale of the land afterward fol-
lows the option, the payment or consideration for the 
option is to be applied as a part of the price of the land, 
does not render it insufficient to support the option." 
Kingsley v. Kressly, 60 Or. 167, 118 P. 678. This was 
a case where optionees allowed to go Into possession as long 
as they performed under the option. A failure to pay the 
first installment operated as a surrender of their possession. 
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The court's analysis (R. 81) calls the lease agree-
ments an option to reinstate the real estate sales contract. 
An option is a unilateral contract acceptable at the discre-
tion of the optionee. The remedy of specific performance 
is available on acceptance by optionee on the theory that 
the option ripened into a mutually binding and mutually en-
forceable contract. 49 Am. Jur., page 137, Specific Pef-
fonnance, paragraphs 117-120. 
"Under lease with option to purchase, relation of 
parties is that of landlord and tenant until option is ex-
ercised, and then option does not relate back to date 
of lease unless lease specifies that rentals paid shall ap-
ply on purchase price, and if option is not exercised, 
payments remain as rentals." Powell v. Hlammon Con-
sol. Gold Fields, 8 Alaska, 153. 
"A lease with option to purchase, if tenant pays 
all rents and taxes, etc., is legal and binding on parties. 
Said agreement providing that it should be void, and 
that option should not exist, if second party defaulted 
in performance thereof, was a lease with option to pur-
chase rather than a "mortgage" and, after defaulting, 
second party bad no right to purchase by tendering 
purchase price and amount of rent in arrears. Bishop 
v. Melton, 202 Ark. 732, 152 SW 2nd 299, ·Gwaltney v. 
Pioneer Trust Co., 1948 Oreg., 199 P. 2nd 250. 
Appellants ,cite the case of Lori, Limited, Inc. et al v. 
Wolfe et al, 192 P. 2nd 112, 85 Cal. App. 2nd 54, in which 
the lessor seeks to apply retroactively a gross revenue ren-
tal covenant where the covenant was silent as to its apply-
ing retroactively or not. Court held the lease to be con-
strued against the lessor and in favor of the lessee when un-
certainty exists. But in the case at bar it is the lessee-appel-
lants who contend the lease is something different than it 
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purports to be, namely, that the lease is not a lease but ra-
ther a contract of sale. This is not the sort of case where 
the construction is construed strictly against the lessor. 
Leases must be given interpretation which will make 
them effective in conformity with the intention of the par-
ties as to the whole lease. Clauses must be given the con-
struction which will be most favorable to the party in whose 
favor they are made, and lessees will be bound with the in-
terpretation they understood the lessors to understand it 
at the time of making it. Every clause and word must be 
given the effect and meaning which is harmonious with the 
actual purpose and intention of the parties. Pappadatos v. 
Mkt. St. Bldg. Corp., 130 Cal. App. 62, 19 P. 2nd 517; Eggen 
v. Wetterborg, 193 Oreg. 145, 237 P. 2nd 970; I. X. L. Fur-
niture House v. Berets, 32 Utah 454, 91 P. 279. 
Appellants in their Answer admit that they entered into 
negotiations with Attorney Clyde D. Sandgren to execute 
the lease agreements (R. 22). Twice they admitted they 
were tenants at will and in default under the lease agree-
ments (R. 14, 16). The lessees have acceded to the con-
struction given the leases by the lessors in constituting them 
as tenants at will by a five-day notice to quirt as tenants at 
will (Defendants' Exhibit 5). The construtcion given by 
the parties to the contract should prevail. Tilton v. Ster-
ling Coal and Coke Co., supra. 
Even if this tenancy were a term tenancy, as contended 
by appellants, surely parties can contract as to the means 
of notice necessary to terminate the tenancy and effect their 
removal. Notice necessary to terminate is nearly ·always 
spelled out in a term lease. Parties may waive by agree-
ment, compliance with statutes regarding notice. Devon-
shire v. Langstaff, 10 Cal. App. 2nd 369, 51 P. 2nd 902. 
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The court was right in holding that the contract was 
clear and explicit as to how appellants were to be removed 
from the premises in event of their default. The intent and 
purpose of the leases could not be clearer started as to the 
respective rights of the parties thereto than does the 4th 
paragraph of the second lease (R. 46-47). Even if the les-
sees were not technically tenants at will, the right of lessors 
was expressly reserved that the lessees in event of their de-
fault may be removed as tenants at will. Even assuming 
that the tenancy of the leases is in fact a term tenancy, it is 
modified and limited by the tenant at will provision. 
Appellants admit that their option to purchase was 
most valuable in view of sums already paid (!Defendants' 
Brief, P. 24) but question the wisdom of the bargain on P. 
18, by stating the consideration for the "bargain" was ex-
cessive. The parties all stated they signed and understood 
the lease agreements, and all but Mr. Swan said they un-
derstood their rights to be defined in the lease agreements 
(Depositions quoted supra). The appellants certainly did 
not demand a penalty rebate when the first contract was 
terminated, but were willing to make their rights in in an 
agreement that preserved to them all their interests, if any, 
they had accrued, with an opportunity to reinstate their full 
rights as under the breached contract by entering into a 
new contract with full ;credit on the principal of all amounts 
they had or were to pay. Appellants found nothing inequi-
table in their lease agreement, and if they chose to default 
under it they have waived any ·penalty they might have suf-
fered before entering into the new contract agreements. 12 
Am. Jur., page 983, Contracts, paragraphs 405-417. The 
court was correct in determining that the parties by mutual 
agree·ment terminated the uniform real estate ·contract (R. 
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98-99). The first and second lease agreements were new 
and inconsistent contracts with the real estate contract. Ap-
pellants became tenants rather than vendees, with an op-
tion to reinstate their rights with a new contract by per-
forming the leases and again becoming vendees. 
Defendants' brief, on P. 22, states that the only differ-
ence in point of law of the positions of the parties under the 
real estate contract and the leases was in the amounts to 
be paid per month. The uniform real estate contract was 
greater than and included the elements of a lease like the 
ones under examination. This being true, the lease would 
be expected to find counter-parts of nearly all its terms in 
a real estate sales contract. But a closer inspection will dis-
close many provisions in the real estate contract that are 
not found in the leases at all. The status of the parties is 
greatly changed as a matter of law, however, in that the 
vendors under the contract had an option to specifically en-
force the sale of the property, sue for accruals, sue for dam-
ages for breach of contract, forfeit payments of buyer and 
dispossess the vendees upon their 'breach thereof. Under 
the leases lessors could not specifically enforce the sale of 
the property, ·could not sue for accruals, except for time of 
lease if the lessees remained in possession, could not sue for 
damages for breach of contract, except for amounts accrued 
under lease, and could not forfeit the payments of buyer 
because the payments were rents to pay for possession of 
the lessees of the premises. Vendees under the contract had 
an obligation to buy premises, while under the leases the 
lessees had a personal option to buy, but yere not under an 
obligation to buy. The leases then yet had to ripen into a 
buyer and seller arrangement. Lessors were willing to al-
low lessees to remain in possession for rents on certain ·pro-
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visions. It seems that appellants are continually declaring 
they have something different from what the agreements 
say they have. First they said they were mortgagors with 
an equity of redemption under the Uniform Real Estate Con-
tract (R. 23), and now they contend they are purchasers 
rather than lessees under the lease agreements. They also 
contend that even though lessees agreed to be removed as 
tenants at will if they default under the leases, that they 
can default under the leases and not be removed as tenants 
at will, because they are instead term tenants (Appellants' 
Brief; P. 21). The stated length of the term was for the 
purpose of fixing a period for the performance of the lease 
to base the exercising of the option upon. Notice the lang-
uage - month to· month basis for a period not to exceed 
one year (or 3 years) as the case may be (R. 14, 16). Also 
there is no agreement to pay a gross amount of rent under 
the lease that appellants promised to pay. The case of An-
drews v. Russell, 259 P. 113, 85 Cal. App. 149, is cited by 
appellants on P. 20 of their brief as authority that statutes 
on tenancies at ·will are held not applicable to leases for def-
inite periods, though terminable if covenants therein are not 
fulfilled. That was a case to quiet title on a tenn lease that 
had terminated by its own terms. Defendant in the case 
said the plaintiff must serve him with Notice to Quit, as 
provided by the tenant at will statute. Held: because the 
tenn lease had terminated before the action brought the 
statutes did not ~apply. In the case at bar the lease provides 
that if covenants are not fulfilled the tenants may be re-
moved as tenants at will. Surely appellants do not contend 
that where the lease for a term provides that upon default 
the lessees may be removed as tenants at will, that the stat-
utes on tenant at will do not apply. What appellants prob-
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ably 1nean to say is that where they have a term tenancy 
they cannot become tenants at will. That is incorrect; they 
contracted to be removed as tenants at will in the event they 
did not perform the terms of the contract. The contract 
even provided that lessors could re-enter and re-let the prem-
ises without notice or legal process to protect the use of the 
premises in the event of default by lessees. The clause mak-
ing the agreement binding on the heirs, executors, adminis-
tra tors and assigns of the respective parties is to provide 
for the exercising of the option agreement in the event of 
the death of one of the parties. 55 Ami Jur., page 513, 
paragraph 42. 
Any lease agreement should have the enumerated pro-
visions on ·P. 20-21 of appellants' brief. On pages 17-18 of 
their brief, appellants contend that they never were in de-
fault under any of the agreements by virtue of the fact that 
the net amount of penalty that the court allowed as an off-
set against the amounts due under the leases was in excess 
of what they owed respondents. This is a dangerous con-
cept under the facts of this case, b~ause none of the par-
ties would be able to know if their contracts were in force 
or in default until a jury determination (as in this case) 
fixed the amounts of payments and rent, etc., in order to 
figure the net penalty. In addition, the payments of rent 
under the lease agreements were further payments required 
to be paid in cash as they became due. This is another evi-
dence that the leases were separate and inconsistent with 
the mutually terminated real estate sales contract. At no 
time before, during, or after the trial were the credits on 
this net penalty tendered or offered in payment of the lease 
installments. The determination of the penalty is one of 
damages and not of perfor,nance of the contract of sale, nor 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
35 
of subsequent agreements, and therefore is not applicable 
to reinstating or enforcement of the subsequent lease agree-
ments. Appellants do not now ask reinstatement of any of 
the contracts. Their prayer is merely for damages. 
In effect, the appellants are contending that this net 
penalty sum is an advance payment of the rents. Brooks 
v. Coppedge, Idaho 1951, 228 P. 2nd 248, is a case much in 
point with the case at bar, in which there is an exhaustive 
examination of the authorities on this question. The term 
lease was breached in that case by a non-payment of rent, 
and the lease provided that the advanced fund was to be 
returned in the event the option to purchase was exercised. 
Held: the fund was not returnable nor applicable to de-
faulted payments where lessee breaches such that the option 
to purchase was never exercised, even where the lease made 
no provision as to what was to be done with the advanced 
sum in the event of a breach. 
In the ·case at ·bar there was no contemplation that this 
"phantom penalty" was to pay future installments under the 
leases and save lessees from default. It was provided, how-
ever, that if the option to purchase were exercised, that all 
amounts theretofore paid by lessees would be credited on 
the principal of a new contract of sale, to be entered into 
at the option of the lessees. Appellants also declare that 
if the net penalty were applied to payments due under the 
second lease, there would remain $31.30 due appellants (Ap-
pellants' brief, P. 18). This is untrue, because in figuring 
the penalty, the court did not include 1952 taxes, which un-
der the lease, the appellants would have been required to 
pay (R. 82, 83). 
under the Kansas case cited on P. 23 of appellants' 
brief, the relationship of the parties was far different from 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
36 
the one in the case at bar. The "option" agreement in the 
case cited was an option to rent or to buy, that was spe-
cifically set out in a Kansas statute, which also allowed a 
six month redemption period. In the case at bar, the op-
tion to buy was a specific arrangement to mature at a spe-
cific time, not upon payment of the purchase price but upon 
payment of specific amounts at specific times. The lease 
was a rental agreement, and the rental was to apply on the 
purchase price only if the specific option were exercised. 
Equitable conversion ·could not occur unless the option were 
exercised by appellants. The Kan·sas transaction is primar-
ily a sale, and the payments are to be considered rent only 
upon the default of the buyer. In the case at bar the po-
sition and intention of the parties are exactly the reverse-
the payments are rents required by the lease and are to be 
considered to apply on the purchase only upon the perform-
ance of the buyer. The courts can save a buyer from the 
effects of a minor default, but they will not specifically en-
force a performance of the buyer to save him from refault. 
The appellants are raising these equitable principles now 
only to show damages, and not to obtain the object of the 
equitable rules, namely, a conveyance of title to the prop-
erty involved. Appellants pray only for damages, and have 
surrendered the premises before judgment and before the 
so-called term of the lease expired (R. 104, 122, 106) and 
have not posted a supersedeas bond. 
A penalty amount should be returned to appellants un-
der the Perkins v. Spencer doctrine, Utah (1952), 243 P. 
2nd 446, only upon a determination that they are entitled 
to equitable relief from an unconscionable retention of for-
feited damages by respondents. It should be obvious that 
appellants have been in a position to protect their equity 
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under any and all of the agreements and dealings of the par-
ties. By entering into the lease agreements appellants 
waived any claim they may have had against an unconscion-
able advantage taken by respondents. In other words, the 
penalty, if any existed, was waived. If the money was re-
garded as given in consideration of the covenants in the 
lease, the title to the money passed to the lessor. Curtis 
v. Arnold,. 43 Cal. App. 97, 184 P. 510; Thompson v. Swiryn, 
95 Cal. App. 2nd 619, 213 P. 2nd 740. Appellants made the 
lease agreements with their eyes open, and not under any 
fraud, duress, nor against public policy (R. 40-42, 46-47) . 
.AJppellants have admittedly been in default under all 
their contracts (R. 14, 16, 21, 30-31, 95-97). It has been a 
habit and a custom for them to be continually in default 
under all the agreements for nearly six years (Defendants' 
Exhibits 1 and 2, Emil Jacobson's Deposition, P. 24). To 
have enforced strict performance of the agreements, the re-
spondents would have had to serve a notice to quit on the 
appellants nearly every single month of the whole period. 
He who seeks equity must do equity. Equity will not re-
lieve against a forfeiture where the party in default for non-
payment of rent has been negligent (grossly) , or has gone 
into default deliberately or inexcusably, or where non-pay-
ment has ~become a custom or a general course of conduct. 
U. S. v. Forness, 125F. 2nd 928; ~Darvirris v. Boston Safe 
. Deposit and Trust Co., 235 Mass. 76, 126 N. E. 382; cases 
cited under 16 AUR 447- 448. 
It would be going to quite an extent to say that respond-
ents waived strict performance of these agreements and had 
lulled appellants to sleep by accepting late or delinquent pay-
ments. Rather, respondents have never succeeded in wak-
ing up the appellants to their obligations. There have been 
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three aggravated breaches of the three contracts. Respond· 
ents in every case have sought to enforce their rights and 
enforce the agreements according to their explicit terms. 
The course of conduct shows that respondents have exhaus-
ted themselves in an effort to obtain the faithful perform-
ance of the appellants on each and every agreement. The 
respondents did not want the premises, but wanted their in-
vestment sufficiently secured. Appellants have had evecy 
opportunity to perform any and all of the agreements, and 
respondents have afforded all possible leniencies to allow 
appellants to buy the property involved. Appellants have 
not been fair in their dealings with respondents, but at no 
place in the record is there any showing that respondents 
took advantage of appellants, or sought an unconscionable 
or unjust enrichment by forfeiture. 
Here we have on the one hand appellants who agreed 
to buy more than they could probably afford, and on the 
other respondents who were accommodation parties in fi-
nancing the transaction. Appellants seek not to reinstate 
themselves as purchasers, but to obtain damages and a pen-
alty rebate - in effect to force respondents to buy back the 
property as un·willing purchasers. Is it the policy of the 
law to relieve the imprudent and make· a bad bargain a good 
bargain? The appellants have sought to ·construe their sta-
tus throughout as something it is not. They seek for "bar-
gains," and to escape the consequences of their obligations. 
Courts are created to enforce contracts that are not tainted 
with fraud or coercion, and not to modify them. Stinson v. 
Godbe, Utah (191H), 160 P. 280. 
The equities in the case at bar are not the same as in 
Perkins v. Spencer, supra, on which appellants rely to com-
pute the amount of the penalty under not only the real es-
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tate contract but under the two leases as well. Respond-
ents did not at the first opportunity seek to retain the down 
payment of purchasers, as in the Perkins v. Spencer case, 
supra. Rather, they waited until the delinquency reached 
$889.41 before they sought an attorney to protect their con-
tract rights, which became substantially impaired, consider-
ing that respondents were making monthly mortgage pay-
ments on the same property (R. 30). It should be kept in 
mind that respondents received not one penny as considera-
tion for the loan, the $4000.00 down payment in cash being 
given toP. K. Nielson, the original seller. Respondents ·were 
in a position where they were dependent on the monthly 
payments of appellants. Respondents in effect allowed ap-
pellants an equity of redemption by granting them a lease 
of the premises with an option to reinstate the contract of 
sale upon faithful performance of the lease. Respondents 
did not have to cancel the contract of sale and enter into 
a lease agreement. They could as well have sued for the 
delinquent payments and the installments as they became 
due. The first lease was breached, but foreclosure came not 
yet, due to the entering into of another lease with an option 
to purchase the equity, if any, ·by performing the lease and 
entering into a new contract of sale giving credit on prin-
cipal for all previous sums paid. This second lease con-
tained an express provision on the part of appellants to for-
feit everything concerning the property, in the event the 
sum of $300.00 was not paid by August 31, 1950, which 
amount was paid August 31, 1950 (R. 82, Defendants' Ex-
hibit 2). Appellants again defaulted and they received a 
notice to quit March 5, 1952. Did respondents now fore-
~close? No, 5~ months elapsed before another notice to 
quit was served August 12, 1952, during which time the ap-
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pellants remained in possession without making or tender-
ing any payments while trying to negotiate a loan (which 
will be discussed in Ans·wer to Point 3) . The last mentioned 
notice gave 34 days to quit the premises (R. 18). Appel-
lants did not vacate, and this action was not commenced 
until November 25, 1952. Still appellants made no payments 
nor tendered any. The trial came on and went to judgment, 
and no payments nor tenders were ever made to protect the 
so-called term or right to reinstate the "contract of sale" as 
provided in 78-36-10, U. C. A., 1953, and Comm. Block Re-
alty Co. v. Merchant's Protective Ass'n, supra. The prem-
ises were surrendered April 11, 1953, to respondents, and 
appellants never offered to apply the $331.30 net penalty 
to reinstate the lease or the option to purchase and be saved 
from a forfeiture. Rather the judgment became a lien on 
the property involved, as well as on the home of respond-
ents·, as provided by law. Appellants appeal for greater 
damages and do not want the property. 
By applying the penalty doctrine, the court has in ef-
fect allowed appellants in default to rescind their contract 
by recovering their payments, except for the rental value 
of the premises while they were in possession. Such a judg-
ment does not allow the respondents anything for their con-
tracts. A purchaser in default cannot claim ·back what he 
has paid, and he is not entitled to rescission. 55 Am. Jur. 
927, 994, Vendor and Purchaser, par. 535, 536, 601. Even 
at that, respondents waited until the equity as represented 
by the net penalty of $331.30 was almost used up before 
they took action to foreclose. There was no unconscionable 
forfeiture under the facts of this case; rather the equities 
were in favor of the respondents. 
The facts in this case are much different than those that 
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impelled the Utah Supreme Court to prevent the forfeiture 
of the sales contract according to its terms in the Perkins v. 
Spencer case, supra. In the case at bar there are the fol-
lowing distinctions: Nearly a six-year period of dealings; 
two subsequent inconsistent agreements to the contract of 
sale; repeated and persistent defaults and breaches by pur-
chasers-lessees; admitted delinquencies; admittedly tenants 
at will; every possible opportunity to reinstate contract of 
sale; an opportunity to pay up delinquencies at any time and 
be restored to the estate; status as tenants rather than pur-
chasers; failure to exercise options to purchase; financial 
hardship of seller; accommodation transaction by seller from 
outset; no unconscionable retention of funds by seller; no 
exercise of time of the essence clause; no attempt to sum-
marily foreclose the equity of purchasers. 
Therefore, even if it be held that the two leases were in 
fact extensions and modifications of the real estate contract 
of sale of June 27, 1947, the Perkins v. Spencer case, supra, 
is not applicable in equity or law to the ·case at bar. Under 
all three instruments no penalty is suffered by allowing the 
parties to stand as they were by enforcing the forfeiture 
agreements as liquidated damages. In addition, in the Per-
kins v. Spencer case, the breach of the purchaser arose out 
of a dispute regarding how the purchase price was to be 
paid. In the case at bar the dispute arose out of the 
breaches of the purchaser and how much was due to be 
paid. 
Respondents respectfully submit that the first and sec-
ond lease agreements were in fact and truth leases, as they 
purported to be on their face and intended by the parties, 
and that by the provisions in the leases appellants' tenancy 
was properly terminated as tenants at will; that appellants 
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\vere not purchasers, but tenants of respondents, and that 
there was no basis for granting appellants equitable relief 
from forfeiture of sums paid either under the leases or un-
der the contract of sa.le. 
ANSWER TO POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING 
THAT THE NOTICES TO QUIT SERWID UPON APPEL-
LANTS (PURCHASERS) COMPUIED WITH THE LAW 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH ON UNLAWFUL DETAINER. 
Appellants contend that because they were not tenants 
at will of the lessors that the notice to quit of August 12, 
1952, was not sufficient to remove them as tenants at will; 
and that respondents had only a right to remove appellants 
as tenants at will, if that right was properly exercised, 
and quote cases that hold that such an option or right can 
be exercised only upon giving a notice of an intention to 
do so, and that suit for possession cannot be summarily 
instituted upon default unless notice is given. In other 
words, as we undertand it, appellants require an alternative 
notice before they are to be given notice to quit, and that if 
they are tenants for a term that the provision of paragraph 
( 4) of the second lease preserving to lessors the right to re-
move lessees in case of default as tenants at will is abso-
lutely meaningless because lessees are entitled to live out 
their term. 
As stated in Answer to Point One, the intention in mak-
ing the second lease was as stated in the fourth paragraph, 
and as intending a forfeiture in the event of non-perform-
ance as shown in paragraph 1 (C). Even conceding that 
the lease were for a specified term, the term is limited by 
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the tenant at will provision. TP.e leases, as well as the con-
tract of sale, provided that upon default the tenants may 
be removed as tenants at will. In both leases appellants 
acknowledged that they were tenants at will, had been con-
stituted as tenants at will because of their default, and then 
expressly covenanted that upon default they may be re-
moved as tenants at will (R. 14, 16). Parties having acted 
under the leases without disagreement are bound by their 
interpretation of instruments, and neither can urge a dif-
ferent construction in his own interest after ·controversy 
~rises. Hinkle v. Blinn, 92 Colo. 302, 19 P. 2nd 1038. If 
such a provision is inconsistent with the alleged term ten-
ancy, the term must give way to the expressed intention 
and purpose of the parties. It should be noted that the lease 
did not provide for a gross amount to be paid for the "term" 
for which lessees would be liable, but stated the lease was 
on a month to month basis (2 (a) of the second lease) and 
that lessees were to become month to month tenants in para-
graph 2 (b). Surely this more closely harmonizes with ex-
pressed intention of the parties that the option to purchase 
was predicated upon faithful performance of the lease by 
paying specified amounts of rents and taxes, etc., at the 
times they are due. If lessees performed they were entitled 
to remain in possession on a month to month basis for spe-
cified length of time in order to exercise the option to enter 
into a new contract of sale (the old one terminated and was 
non-existent). It would have been wrongful for lessors to 
terminate the estate and incidentally the option, if the les-
sees were not in default. The opportunity to reinstate the 
contract of sale was one of the primary objects of the lease, 
but if the opportunity were rejected, the right to remove 
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as tenants at will was purposely preserved as a specific 
remedy. 
At most, the lessees were month to month tenants, and 
the notice of March 5, 1952, gave 26 days notice to quit be-
fore the next rent became due, and that the notice to quit 
of August 12, 1952, gave 18 days notice to quit before the 
next rent was due, both in compliance with 78-36-3 (2), Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit I and Defend-
ants' Exhibit 5). 
Even if appellants had a term tenancy, they did not 
protect it under 78-36-10, U. C. A., 1953, and in fact made 
no valid tender, as will be shown in Answer to Point Three, 
and the court rightfully declared the term at an end under 
said 78-36-10. The provision that lessors may, if lessees va-
cate or default, re-enter and le-let the premises does not 
make a term tenancy. It was within the contemplation of 
the parties that the option may be refused. The lessees 
did not covenant to pay a gross amount for the term and 
said provision allowed lessors the use of the land in case les-
sees did not faithfully perform and thus exercise the option 
to purchase. None of the provisions in the leases give ap-
pellants a right to remain for a definite period if they· de-
fault in their payments. The protection provided lessors 
was in the faithful performance of the lease by the lessees, 
with the alternative to remove lessees and dispose of the 
property. To ignore the leases is to take from lessors their 
agreement and protection and enable the "purchasers" to 
speculate in the value of the land at "sellers" risk. If the 
property declined rapidly in value, the lessees were in a po-
sition to refuse to pay the original contract price by drop-
ping the option and considering the payments ·as rents as 
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they are now doing. The option was valuable to appellants, 
as they state in their brief on P. 24. 
It seems obvious from the terms of the lease as a whole 
that this was not a term tenancy. 
Appellants on P. 25-27 of their brief contend that they 
were entitled to a notice that their term tenancy was de-
clared a tenancy at will ·before the provision in the lease 
could operate that they could be removed as tenants at will, 
because the default did not automatically terminate the term 
tenancy. 
Respondents admit the necessity of giving the statu-
tory notice required to terminate an estate created by the 
contract, unless the notice required is modified by the con-
tract. In the case at bar the notices to quit were in accord-
ance with the statutes. 
Cases are quoted by appellants at P. 27 of their brief, 
where suit for possession was summarily brought without 
giving notice of intention to treat the contract as ended. 
These cases hold that either the contract must expressly be 
made to void itself automatically and absolutely, upon de-
fault, or that notice is required to terminate the ·contract re-
lations. It may be that in the case at bar, the relationship 
between lessors and lessees was not automatically termi-
nated. The question is not what the relationship was, but 
how it was to be terminated. The parties agreed that upon 
default by the lessees, that the lessors had the right to re-
move lessees as tenants at will. Five day notice to quit is 
required by 1953 U. C. A. Section 78-36-3(2) to remove a 
tenant at will. This was in fact given twice to lessees, as 
admitted on P. 24 of appellants' brief. 
Some point is made of the right to exercise the option 
to terminate the agreement. This right was exercised and 
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notice was given that the right was thereby exercised and 
that therefore the tenants should quit the premises. If two 
notices were required - one to notify of intention to exer:.. 
cise right of termination and one to terminate- these were 
given. The notice to quit of March 5, 1952, said: "we here-
by notify you that you have forefited the right to purchase 
said property and your tenancy under said lease shall ter-
minate on the 31st day of March, 1952" (Defendants' Ex-
hibit 5). The notice to quit of August 12, 1952, notified 
again the appellants and required that the premises be de-
livered up (Plaintiffs' Exhibit I). 
If the leases were in truth extensions of the contract of 
sale, then the leases themselves would operate as alternative 
notices to pay up or surrender the premises and their rights 
thereto. Some point is made of this alternative noti·ce, but 
even on appellants' own theory that all three agreements 
were contracts of sale, the alternative requirement is laid 
to rest on a contract of sale by the case of Forrester v. Cook, 
77_ Utah 137, 292 P .. 206, wherein it was held that a simple 
five-day notice to quit not in the alternative was sufficient 
to remove the vendee as a tenant at will when vendee was 
in default. 
It is felt by appellants that Pacific Development Co. 
v. Stewart, 113 Utah 403, 195 P. 2nd 748, required notice 
in the alternative to be given in the case at bar. That case 
is not similar to the case at bar at all, in that here there 
was no conduct or lulling to sleep of vendees to feel secure 
in not strictly performing upon the promise that no for-
feiture "at that time" was contemplated. In the case at bar 
the forfeiture had already occurred under the contract of 
sale by agreement of the parties, and no forfeiture for de-
fault had therefore been written into the leases. It was a 
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rental agreement with an option, and the rights of the par-
ties were to be determined under the second lease. The 
court found that no waiver occurred under the last named 
agreement because defendants had pleaded only that the 
waiver of strict performance applied to the contract of sale 
(R. 23-24, 44-46). If the subsequent leases were but con-
tracts of sale, then the lease agreements themselves were al-
ternative notices to pay up or get out, and the only question 
remaining would ·be if the time given to pay up ·were rea-
sonable of not. Pacific Development Co. v. Stewart, supra. 
The equities duscussed in this case are worthy of review 
as applying to the case at bar. 
The court found the lease agreements to be leases with 
a monthly rent reserved upon certain conditions. If these 
agreements were leases, then there could be no waiver of 
performance such to require an alternative notice to pay 
arrearages, as in the Pacific !Development Co. v. Stewart 
case, supra. 
"The covenant to pay rent is a continuing covenant 
to which doctrine of waiver is inapplicable, and lessor 
will not be estopped to claim right of possession of re-
alty for non payment of rent merely because he per-
mits defaults to ·continue for a time as to such pay-
ments." Title and Trust Co. v. Durkheimer Inv. c·o., 
155 Oreg. 427, 63 P. 2nd 909. A forfeiture may be de-
clared by a landlord who is lenient in allowing nonpay-
ment of rent to accumulate, and a waiver is not effec-
ted by such indulgence. Francis Bros. v. Schallberger, 
137 Oreg. 529, 3 P. 2nd 530; Jones, Landlord and Ten-
ant, par. 499. 
At P. 32-33 of their brief appellants say the case of 
Federal Land Bank of Berkeley v. Sorenson et al, 101 Utah 
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305, 121 P. 2nd 398, does not apply because in the case at 
bar waiver of strict performance was pleaded, whereas in 
the cited case it ·was not. The case did not turn on that 
point at all, but quotes the case of Leone v. Zuniga, 84 Utah 
417, 34 P. 2nd 699, where no notice was given at all before 
the suit for possession was commenced, and the forfeiture 
provision of the contract was not self -executing. The rule 
is that a notice of intention must be served upon defaulting 
vendee where forfeiture provision is not self-executing, in 
order to let the vendee know whether to vacate, expect to 
be allowed to perform the contract, or expect to be sued for 
accruals or specific performance. The Federal Land Bank 
of Berkeley v. Sorenson case, supra, expressly decides at P. 
400-401 that it is not the rule nor the practice to require 
a notice in the alternative to pay arrearages or quit, when 
the forfeiture provision is not self-executing. We respect-
fully submit that under the cases the respondents were not 
required to serve an alternative notice, but only a notice of 
intention to forfeit and demand for possession of the prem-
ises. This was done on two occasions in the case at bar, 
as above set out, and according to the explicit remedy of the 
leases and contract of sale that appellants may be removed 
as tenants at will. The right existed and was exercised. 
The notices involved complied with the statutes of the 
State of Utah. Respondents could have given an alternative 
notice, as provided under Section 78-36-3, subsection (3) or 
(5), U. C. A. 1953, but were not required to do so. Those 
subsections provide for an alternative remedy, even in the 
case of a tenancy at will, where the lessor or vendor desires 
the alternative of performance or possession to be timely 
made. We respectfully submit, however, that the case at 
bar is to be decided on the basis of Section 78-36-3 (2), in 
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the case of month to month tenants or as tenants at will, un-
der either of which categories the notices to quit herein 
complied. 
ANSWER TO POINT THREE 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING 
THAT, AFTER MARCH 5, 1952, APPELLANTS MADE 
NO TENDER OF SUMS DUE UNDER THE CONTRACTS, 
IN REFUSING FURTHER TESTIMONY ON THIS ISSUE, 
AND IN NOT SUBMITTING THE ISS·UE TO THE JURY. 
Throughut appellants' brief the issue of tender is re-
peated and hammered upon incessantly, appellants claiming 
tenders and offers, and the wrongful refusal by respond-
ents of those tenders and offers. On page 32 of their brief, 
appellants state that the record is replete· with evidence of 
attempts and offers to pay up the contract, but turn around 
and say that the court erred in refusing testimony as to 
whether a tender had been made under the ·contracts. The 
issue of tender is important only in two instances: first, if 
the second lease constituted in fact a term tenancy such 
that the appellants were entitled to reinstate themselves 
for the balance of their term as provided in 78-36-10, U. C. 
A., 1953; and second, if the court by the powers of equity 
under the facts elected to save the appellants from a for-
feiture either by way of construing the leases as contracts 
of sale or by preventing the failure of the option to purchase 
under the leases notwithstanding non-performance of the 
lease covenants. 
If the tenancy were a term tenan·cy, appellants have 
waived a right to tender by not making a valid tender, not 
keeping the tender alive, and not offering in open court with-
in 5 days after judgment the amounts due to be restored to 
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the estate, as provided in 78-36-10, supra, and as will be 
shown hereafter regarding tender in fact and validity of 
tender. Idaho has an identical statute to Utah's 78-36-10, 
supra, and it was held in Brooks v. Coppedge, supra, that 
lessees had not protected their term tenancy by paying the 
amounts due as provided in the statute, and had therefore 
been terminated by their own fault; that lessor was entitled 
to rents or possession, and the lease was not terminated un-
til five days after judgment. The record in the case at bar 
is entirely silent as to any tender in court before, during, 
or after the trial or judgment. The appellants did make an 
offer of proof that a tender of all delinquencies under 2nd 
lease had been made by appellants before the commence-
ment of the action upon receipt of the notice to quit of 
March 5, 1952, at which proffer of proof the trial judge 
asked if that was all that was tendered, and counsel replied 
with another offer, this time to refinance (R. 89-90). 
If the leases were contract of sale and equity had 
deemed to save the vendees from forfeiture thereunder, a 
tender of all sums past due would have to be made, but only 
if it were also found that vendors had waived strict per-
formance to entitle vendees a reasonable time to make up 
arrearages. This concept is already discussed under Ans-
wers to Point One and Two above. 
If the lease option to purchase were to be reinstated, 
even though the lease had fallen from lessees' default,a ten-
der would have to be made of the sums due under the lease. 
This is contrary to the cases which hold that when optionee 
has failed to take advantage of the option according to its 
terms, an offer of readiness to perform is too late; that where 
the lease falls the option to purchase goes with it; and that 
a refusal to accept past due rentals under a lease with option 
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to purchase is justified, to preserve the right to declare a 
forfeiture. Rushing v. Mayfield Co., 62 F. 2nd 318; Bar-
croft v. Livacich, 35 Cal. App. 2nd 710, 96 P. 2nd 951. 
In appellants' counterclaim for affirmative relief, they 
alleged that the contract of sale and deed were a mortgage 
with an equity of redemption. This theory was held to and 
not abandoned by the appellants until they wrote their brief 
(R. 23, 25; Appellants Brief, P. 9). They also alleged they 
\Vere contract purchasers under the contract of sale and 
the two_ leases, and were not in default thereunder (R. 23-
24), and that a penalty against them was ~being worked re-
garding the liquidated damages and forfeiture (R. 24, 25). 
Nowhere do appellants ask for damages for wrongful ter-
mination of contract, nor have the pleadings been anywhere 
changed, except as appears in a minute Entry after the jury 
trial and argument of counsel in reapplication of the law 
to the facts, the appellants sought to amend to counterclaim 
for damages for wrongful termination of contract (R. 76). 
The motion was denied. Even if there had been a tender, 
it would have no effect, as a matter of law, under the plea~­
ings of appellants except for the denied motion for permis~ 
sion to amend the answer to counterclaim for damages for 
wrongful breach of contract. At the time of the trial the 
issue of tender was not therefore before the court. 
Appellants had asked for a jury to try the issues of 
fact reserved in the Memorandum Decision of February 21, 
1953, with ten days reserved in which the parties could en-
ter any objections or proposals they might have had to the 
statement of issues reserved (R. 69, 49-50). No issue as to 
tender was proposed by the appellants, and none was re-
served to the jury. An offer of proof before the court (R. 
89-90) was made that a tender had been made of payments 
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due under the second lease. The court found against ap-
pellants on the matter of tender, and rightfully so, because 
Swans never did tender enough to pay up the delinquency, 
even assuming that Swans had the money to make a valid 
tender. Mr. Swan's deposition and that of Mr. Jacobson 
show that Swan was short of making up the delinquencies 
all the time. 
Let us examine the pleadings and the evidence with re-
gard to this alleged tender, since on P. 28 of their brief, as 
well as elsewhere, appellants contend they had pleaded ten-
der and had prayed for specific performance of the contract. 
Respondents fail to find any phraseology in the prayer of 
the answer and affirmative defense (R. 24, 25) asking that 
the contract of sale be specifically enforced. Nor do re-
spondents find any pleading in the answer that a tender of 
sums due under the second lease was made as is offered 
for proof in the Partial Transcript (R. 23-23; 89-90). 
Rather, the pleadings read that the defendants "offered to 
the plaintiffs payment of all sums due at that time under 
the schedule of payments of Exhibits A, B, and C, but plain-
tiffs refused said payment"; and "defendants then offered 
to refinance the purchase" (R. 23) . It will be seen that ap-
pellants did not plead they would pay rents and taxes, etc., 
due under the second lease, but all sums due under all the 
agreements. Let us see if this was done. 
The Answer admits the non-payment of the amounts 
set out in paragraph 26 of the Complaint that are due un-
der the second lease agreement (R. 21, 9-10). These amounts 
as alleged are $100 payment due for each of the following 
months: November, 1950; January, 1951; January, 1952, 
and March, 1952 (among others); taxes, 1950, of $102.59; 
taxes, 1951, of $106.53 (1952 taxes due but unknown at 
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These amounts are approximately $700 (not counting the 
1952 taxes, of course) and all are past due and delinquent 
at the time appellants allege a tender was made immediately 
after receiving the notice to quit of March 5, 1952. In the 
court's Analysis these amounts are repeated as delinquen-
cies, and in the Findings of Fact they are repeated except 
for the omission of a $100 payment for January, 1951 (R. 
82, 97). Therefore, the amounts due at the time of the ser-
vice of the Notice to Quit of March 5, 1952, were not less 
than $596.62, under the second lease alone, and under the 
Partial Transcript of offer of proof the appellant George 
Swan offers to prove that he tendered repeatedly to the re-
spondent payment of all that was delinquent under the sec-
ond lease agreement (R. 89-90). Now let us look at the 
deposition of appellant George Swan on this matter. 
Beginning at page 8, Mr. Swan is asked if he ever 
made a tender of the payments to Mr. and Mrs. Jacob-
son, to which he answered: "Through Attorney Sand-
gren, yes." Mr. Swan was asked how much money he 
took to Mr. Sandgren's office and he answered: "four 
hundred and some dollars, that covered delinquent 
taxes for some two hundred dollars, one hundred dol-
lars monthly payment, insurance, and two years' water 
bill." When Mr. Swan was asked if he tendered it in 
the form of ·cash, he answered "I had it with me. He 
wouldn't accept it." On page 10 Mr. Swan reiterates 
the payments he "tendered" which Mr. Sandgren re-
fused to accept. Mr Swan, in answer to the question if 
he had made any other tenders since then, answered: 
"Yes, through Clyde Sandgren we made several ap-
proaches to have it refinanced and pay it off; but it 
seemed we couldn't agree on the amount owing." When 
asked if he had made any offer to pay the rent after 
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March, 1952, Mr. S.wan answered: "Well, we made an 
offer to pay off the entire contract; inasmuch as we 
had failed the first time we supposed Mr. Jacobson no 
longer wished that sort of thing, so we tried to take 
over the entire contract . . . ." Mr. Swan testi-
fied that he had received an approval on a loan from 
Clair Mortenson for $8400.00 in October, 1952 at pages 
11-12, and on page 17 Mr. Swan admitted he knew that 
the $8400.00 was not enough to pay off the balance due 
respondents. 
In the Memorandum Decision, the court says of the offer 
to refinance the purchase, that "It isn't made to appear by 
what agreement they could offer, and thereafter defend up-
on the basis of such offer, to pay eight months' delinquen-
cies at that date. It doesn't appear in the original writings, 
nor is it stated in the Answer. It does not therefore con-
stitute a defense" (R. 44). 
Not only was the question of tender not before the 
court, but there was sufficient evidence on the question in 
the depositions of the parties to show that no bona fide ten-
der had ever been made by appellants, even on the amounts 
due under the lease agreement "C", let alone the payments 
due on all of the agreements "A", "B", and "C". Mr. Swan 
testified to all the tenders and offers he had made and could 
not have testified to any more. The appellants were bound 
by their sworn testimony, and the court was justified in 
finding there was no valid tender, nor any offer to refinance 
the whole transaction; and if there were a right to have this 
matter heard by the jury, appellants waived it by not ob-
jecting or proposing that it be included in the reserved is-
sues of fact as provided in the Memorandum Decision (R. 
50) , since this was ··chiefly a proceeding in equity, as dis-
closed by the pleadings. The appellants had in mind the ob-
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taining of damages and a repayment of sums under the pen-
alty theory. The record is silent as to a tender in open 
court of any sums or payments to show good faith and keep 
an alleged tender alive. Respondents respectfully submit 
that in this case there is no evidence to sustain a finding of 
a bona fide legal tender of sums due, but there is ample evi-
dence and admissions of the parties involved, in their depo-
sitions, that no valid tender was ever made. The ·court's 
finding on this should be sustained. 
On pages 29 and 31 of their brief, appellants state that 
by refusing the tender of sums due made March 5, 1952, 
that the respondents wrongfully terminated the contract of 
purchase, and that respondents are not entitled to treble 
damages for unlawful detainer. Respondents contend there 
was no legal tender at all that they were required to accept, 
even if appellants' stated propositions on page 31 of their 
brief are true. If the appellants were entitled to bring their 
payments current, they never did by tender either to re-
spondents or to the court. From Mr. Swan's deposition it 
is plain to see that at no time, and certainly not at this late 
date, have appellants been in a financial position to assume 
the whole contract, even under the original terms. They 
do not ask for the privilege of making a tender now, but 
only to have the jury find a tender was made, in order to 
allow damages for wrongful termination of contract. The 
premises are surrendered, and no stay of judgment has been 
requested. Appellants say on page 8 of their brief that of 
course nothing further was paid after the notice to quit of 
March 5, 1952. This does not follow logically, and the ap-
pellants had a duty to pay while they occupied the premises 
and a duty to mitigate damages and to preserve their rights 
by tendering into court or offering in writing as provided 
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by the statutes of Utah, 78-27-1, 78-36-10, U. C. A., 1953. 
Incidentally, appellants did not pay nor offer to pay the 
attorney's fee incurred by respondents enforcing the sec-
ond lease agreement, as mentioned on page 23 of Emil Ja-
cobson's Deposition, and pages 15 and 19 of George Swan's 
Deposition. 
Also the "offer" to pay all sums due under "A", "B", 
and "C", as alleged in appellants' Answer (R. 23) falls woe-
fully short when it is understood that a large proportion of 
the $889.41 delinquency agreed to be paid under the first 
lease agreement was in fact not paid. The jury found that 
$1440.00 had been paid on the principal and interest under 
the first lease, which provided for a rental of $80 per month 
which amounts to $960 for one year. Thus, under the first 
lease it was agreed that $1849.41 be paid by the end of the 
year, plus taxes and insurance, which were paid. For the 
same year $1440.00 was paid, leaving a total delinquency 
at the end of the year in the amount of $449.41 (R. 14, 16, 
63, 96). This amount was never paid, and was not men-
tioned in the second lease agreement. If it be held that this 
delinquency was waived, then it should be held that by the 
same reasoning appellants' claim to a penalty was waived. 
At least a new agreement was entered into, and considering 
the original contract terms, the original contract of sale 
was never kept up to date according to its terms. This is 
another reason for sustaining the holding of the lower court 
that the lease agreements ·were not extensions or modifica-
tions of the contract of sale, but were complete and entire 
in themselves and referred to the old contract only for the 
purpose of fixing the consideration for the new (R. 44-46). 
Legal tender of the amounts due under the second lease was 
not pleaded by appellants as they plead an offer of sums due 
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under the schedule of payments of Exhibits 'A", "B", and 
"C", and an offer to refinance. The court found against 
the appellants in the Findings of Fact (R. 23, 98) regarding 
what had been pleaded. 
One other matter is worthy of note on "tender" of all 
sums due claimed by appellants regarding the "blocking" 
of appellants' efforts to refinance the whole obligation when 
they had re·ceived a commitment so to do (R. 23, Appel-
lants' Brief, P. 11, 32., 33). The depositions quoted showed 
a commitment in October, 1952, from Clair Mortenson for 
$8400.00 (not before the second notice of August 15, 1952, 
as claimed in their brief) that respondents blocked by claim-
ing $9600.00 due. At the outset, appellants claimed $2000-
$4000 more had been paid than the jury found (Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit "J"), and as stated on page 11 of their brief, the is-
sue had to be resolved by the jury to be sure. 
If appellants had paid $80 per month regularly, as pro-
vided in the contract of sale, by the time of the trial they 
would have paid three months less than·six years, and would 
have paid the principal of $10,000 balance due at inception 
of contract, down to $6942.84. Of total payments of $5520.-
00, $2462.84 would apply on interest and $3057.16 on prin-
cipal, at the same time ~being delinquent, as in fact they 
were, for 1950, 1951, and 1952 taxes amounting to approxi-
matly $325, fire insurance premium for 1950, 1951, and 1952 
of $78.00, and water assessment of $9.50. The jury found 
that appellants had paid for the same period (even where 
leases provided for $100 instead of $80 per month) but 
$4400.00. Being behind then $1120 would naturally increase 
the interest accrued and decrease the prin·cipal as above cal-
culated. It can be seen from this that the amount of inter-
est appellants should have paid under the original real es-
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tate sales contract was well in excess of $2500.00; and by 
adding taxes, fire insurance premium, and water assess-
ment, amounting in all to about $400, attorney's fees of 
$204.40, paid to Attorney Clyde Sandgren by Jacobsons, 
and $350 for prosecuting action to protect respondents' 
rights under the contracts (Swan's [)eposition, P. 15, 19;; 
R. 82-83, 97) the amount left of the $4400 paid by appel-
lants to apply on the $10,000 original balance is less than 
$1000 in any event. So to get out whole, even under ap-
pellants' theory of applying the terms of the original con-
tract, respondents were entitled to an amount in excess of 
$9000.00. The most that appellants could borrow was 
$8400.00, as shown above. Clearly, if the alleged tender was 
made to pay off the original real estate contract, the re-
spondents would be entitled to interest at 5%, as stated 
therein. 
Under the law appellants never effected a valid tender. 
"A mere offer to pay does not constitute a valid 
tender; the law requires that the tenderer have the 
money present and ready, and produce and actually of-
fer it to the other party. Tender implies the physical 
act of offering the money or thing to be tendered. The 
law requires an actual, present, physical offer; it is not 
satisfied by a mere spoken offer to pay, which, although 
indicative of present intention to produce it, is unac-· 
companied by any visible manifestation of intention to 
make the offer good." 52 Am. Jur., 219, Tender, par. 
7. 
"The thing to ·be tendered must be actually pro-
duced and proffered to a party entitled thereto; a mere 
offer to pay being insufficient. The tenderer must place 
the money or property in such a position that his con-
trol over it is relinqunshed for a sufficient time to en-
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able the tenderee, if he so desires, to reduce it to pos-
session by merely reaching out and laying hold of the 
money or thing; and a person is not bound to say wheth-
er or not he will accept the money or thing until it is 
produced." 62 CJ 672-673, Tender, par. 41. 
The party relying on a tender, either defensively or for 
affirmative relief, must plead a valid tender, including the 
date and amount tendered and its refusal. Especially is it 
necessary to allege present readiness and willingness to pay 
where the debt or obligation is not discharged hy tender 
and its refusal. 52 Am. Jur. 248, Tender, par. 48. 
A tender must be kept good and the money be paid into 
court or an averment be made of a readiness and willingness· 
to pay the same on the order of the court, especially where 
the amount due is in dispute. Weigell v. Gregg, 161 Wis., 
413, 154 NW 645; LeVine v. Whitehouse, 37 Utah 260, 109 
P. 2; Hirsh v. Ogden Furniture Co., 48 Utah 434, 160 P. 283; 
62 CJ 693, Tender, par. 87. 
Tender must be made for the full amount at the peril 
of the tenderor, and a tender of a less amount is his misfor-
tune. The tender must include all damages suffered or ex-
penses incurred by the creditor by reason of the default of 
the debtor. Where contract contains absolute provisions 
for the payment of attorneys fees, the tender must include 
them. 62 CJ 660-662, Tender, par. 6, 9. 
Appellants had a copy of the second lease agreement 
signed by the respondents which recited the days and 
amounts of the payments due thereunder (Swan's Deposi-
tion, page 6). Appellants knew or should have known what 
payments were due and unpaid. To not pay the right 
amount is another evidence of bad faith on the part of the 
appellants, who now ask the court to remand this case for 
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determination of damages for wrongful termination of "con-
tract" for refusal to accept tender of rents, taxes, insurance 
premium, and water assessment due under the second lease. 
Even under a term lease, if the amount of rent ten-
dered is not enough, the lease is forfeited and terminated. 
Barlow v. Hoffman, (1938) Colo., 86 P. 2nd 239; McCray 
v. Kelly, (1939) Tex. Civ. App., 130 SW 2nd 458. 
Tenders by tenant under a lease of insufficient amounts 
of rent is equivalent to no tenders at all, and is not a defense 
in summary proceeding for unlawful detainer. Commercial 
Block Realty Co. v. Merchants' Protective Ass'n, 71 Utah 
505, 267 P. 1009. No tender in writing was ever made and 
no deposit in court. 
Respondents respectfully submit that no valid tender 
of amounts due under second lease was ever made, and that 
no bona fide offer was ever presented to pay off the whole 
obligation, as admitted ·by George W. Swan, appellant, in his 
deposition. The transcript of the trial record on an offer of 
proof of tender requested for this record on appeal by ap-
pellants (R. 111) is not argued in appellants' brief. Point 
3 of appellants brief assigns as error the finding of the 
court that appellants made no tender of sums due under 
the contracts. This is not the same as finding no ten-
der made of rents and taxes due under the second lease 
alone. The ·court, then, did not err in making the finding 
of fact that no offer to pay under contracts, or offer to re-
finance, was ever made (R. 98). 
POINT ONE ON CROSS-APPEAL 
THE COURT ERRED IN HO·LDING THAT THERE 
IS A PENALTY IN THIS CASE ARISING OUT OF EX-
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HIBITS "A", "B", AND "C" A'ITACHED TO THE COM-
PLAINT, OR EITHER OF THEM, AND IN LIMITIN1G 
THE AMOUNT OF RECOVERY OF THE· ·PLANTIFFS, 
.AN[) IN AWARDING DEFENDANTS JUDGMENT 
AGAINST PLAINTIFFS FOR THE SUM OF $331.30 TO-
GETHER WITH INTEREST, BECAUSE THE COURT 
HELD, AND RIGHTuY SO, THAT EXHIBIT "A" WAS 
MUTUALLY TERMINATED BY AGREEMENTS OF THE 
PARTIES, EXHIBITS "B" AND "C'", AND. THEREBY 
THEY MUTUALLY. RELEASED AND DISCHARGED 
EACH OTHER FROM ALL OBLIGATIONS ARISING 
OR GROWING OUT OF EXHIBIT "A", BY EXECUTING 
EXHIBITS "B" AND "C", AND BY THEREBY ESTAB-
LISHING THE RELATIONSHIP OF LESSORS AND LES-
SEES, THE LESSEES BECOMING TENANTS AT WILL 
AND THERE SHOULD HAVE BEEN NO O·FFSET, BY 
USING ANY AMOUNTS PAID ON EXHIBIT "A" BY 
SWANS AGAINST THE AMOUNT PLAINTIFF WAS EN-
TITLED TO RECOVER. 
The arguments previously set out in answer to appel-
lants Points One to Three, whereby respondents submit 
that the two lease agreements were new, separate, indepen-
dent, and inconsistent in regard to the contract of sale (R. 
42); that the contract of sale was mutually terminated by 
the two leases; that the appellants were lessees and not ven-
dees removable as tenants at will of respondents are here-
by incorporated by reference herein. 
The court rightfully held the contract of sale to be 
mutually terminated by agreement between the parties up-
on entering into the two lease agreements (R. 45), and that 
the rights and obligations of the parties are to be deter-
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mined under the last contract, Exhibit "C' (the second 
lease) (R. 42). However, the court then proceeded to off-
set what was due respondents under the second lease agree-
ment by an alleged penalty suffered by appellants under 
the mutually terminated agreement- the contract of sale. 
This, we respectfully submit, was error. Cannot two par-
ties dealing at arm's length agree to forfeiture or a settling 
of accounts for a valuable consideration. 12 Am. Jur. 1011, 
1013, 1038, 1040, Contracts, par. 431, 433, 455, 457, Ocean 
Accident and Guaranty Co. v. Meek, 61 Utah 426, 215 P. 
810. Under this last named case, a mutually rescinded con-
tract is held to no longer exist in legal effect, and no cause 
of action may be brought upon it by either party. 
As before indicated, appellants had prerogatives and 
options under the leases that they did not have previously, 
and respondents had lost the consideration of their bargain 
and the right to specifically enforce the sale. The respond-
ents had to carry the risk and the appellants could reinstate 
their original contract of sale or not, as- they chose. Re-
spondents did not have to cancel the contract, but could 
have enforced the performance or sued for the installments 
as they became due, at the expense of the buyer. For the 
court to say that the parties didn't mean to stand by their 
solemn agreements at the times the agreements were con-
summated, and to say that it was inequitable for appellants 
to agree to such, or that it was inequitable for them to de~ 
cide to drop their option to buy, is an invasion of the right 
of contract. If the penalty doctrine applies to a mutually 
terminated contract, it is impossible for parties to cancel a 
contract without the phantom-penalty hovering in the back-
grol.md for either party to call forth -as an ally when con-
ditions change enough to assert themselves. The penalty 
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was not asserted at the time of the cancellation of the con-
tract. 
By applying the penalty to the contract of sale the court 
has in effect allowed the defaulting vendees to rescind the 
contract and has placed them in a status as renters for the 
entire period. As before pointed out, no unconscionable con-
duct or unfair advantage is shown in the record. The deal-
ings were above.,jboard and understood by all the parties at 
each step of the transaction. All the Depositions are to that 
effect. The appellants have been in defu.ult on all of their 
contracts. 
By entering into the leases with option to purchase, 
appellants got more than they would have received by ap-
plying the Perkins v. Spencer doctrine, supra, namely, pos-
session of the premises with an option to purchase title at 
seller's risk, whereas under the penalty theory they were 
entiltled to an accounting. What if the property rapidly 
declined in value,or was damaged or destroyed? Could not 
then the appellants choose not to exercise the option? The 
respondents would not ibe able at that time to specifically 
enforce the sale. The parties so understood. Appellants 
have had their reasons for their choice of procedure in not 
wanting to be contract purchasers, and even if they hadn't, 
they have not carried their share of the load, as evidenced 
by the delinquency of taxes, insurance, water assessments 
and attorney's fees from the outset of the transaction, never 
having paid any of these unless forced to do so. Respond-
ents feel very strongly that appellants have not clean hands 
while asking for equity in this matter. 
If the penalty under the first contract is considered 
held in abeyance by the parties pending the outcome of the 
exercise of the option to purchase, this would make a de-
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termination of the fact that a retention of payments for 
default constituted a penalty depend on future circumstan-
ces. This being so, at the time of the trial the equities were 
nearly balanced, as reflected in the net penalty amount ad-
judged for appellants of only $331.30. Therefore, at the 
time of the trial there was no penalty, and it was error to 
apply the penalty doctrine of Perkins v. Spencer, supra. 
Under appellants' own theory, if all three agreements were 
contracts to sell the premises involved, then under all three 
contracts there was no penalty at the time of trial. To so 
hold, in effect, allows the appellants to rescind their agree-
ments, treat themselves as renters, and to enforce a pur-
chase of the premises at the end of their dealings against 
the respondents, in spite of persistent defaults by the ap-
pellants and constant readiness to perform by the respond-
ents. This denies to respondents the benefits of their con-
tracts, and places a great burden upon them, with no rem-
edy against the constantly defaulting possessors of the 
property. 
To hold that the parties mutually terminated an agree-
ment, and then hold that it effected a penalty against one 
of theparties who received a consideration therefore in re-
ceiving a new agreement is inconsistent and contrary to the 
right of contract. The policy of law is discussed in 49 Am. 
Jur. 75, Specific Performance, par. 60. Specific perform-
ance has been lost to respondents in this instance, because 
of the mutually terminated contract and the nature of the 
new agreement to lease.. Respondents could not obtain 
specific performance of the leases, because there was no 
obligation on the part of appellants to stay in possession, 
nor pay for a whole term, nor exercise the option to pur-
chase, nor enter into a new real estate sales contract. 
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Respondents were entitled to receive payments for the, 
amounts of the rent payable in advance, taxes, insurance 
~'- premiums, and water assessment, for the time appeHants 
t retained possession of the property. We submit that while 
~ the rights and obligations of the parties are determined ·by 
the second lease agreement (R. 42), that the amounts due 
thereunder were not subject to any offset for a penalty 
suffered by the appellants, and that the respondents should 
have been awarded judgment as prayed for in their com-
plaint (R. 11) for the rents, taxes, insurance premium, wa-
ter assessment, and treble damages since September 15, 
1952 free and clear of any set-off of the appellants. 
In the conclusion and prayer of their brief, appellants 
ask this Court to find that all three agreements are one con-
tract of sale, and that respondents are entitled only to ren-
tal for the time the premises were occupied. This ignores 
the leases completely, and in effect asks for a rescission; 
and this plea im made admitting that appellants have 
breached all three agreements, and assuming that their 
breaches have continually bettered their position. The Per-
kins v. Spencer case never announced such a doctrine. Are 
not respondents entitled to anything for the ·broken ·coven-
ants, trampled contracts, attorneys' fees to draw up con-
tracts and obtain possssion? The appellants feel they can 
ignore the agreements completely, pay as they please, and 
be liable only for a rental value. This is· a speculation in 
land values at vendor's risk. 
The court holds that appellants are not entitled to res-
cission of "A" because it was mutually terminated, and that 
"B" had expired according to its terms, but that appellants 
were not entitled to rescission of "C" because they were ad-
mittedly in default (R. 46). Appellants are in effect ask-
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ing for a resc1Ss1on of all three "contracts", but under 
all three there is no penalty as of the time of this suit. The 
rental basis is part of the method of determining the ven-
dor's damages, once it has been decided that there is in truth 
a penalty involved. The law concedes, however, that the 
vendor is entitled to a fair return on his investment. A for-
feiture will be enforced when the contract so provides, un-
less it is shocking to the conscience of the Court, whereupon 
the forfeiture becomes a penalty. Perkins v. Spencer, sup-
ra. 
In Perkins v. Spencer, the case of Cooley v. Call is quo-
ted approvingly, wherein it was held that a forfeiture of an 
amount that figured at a 10% (without taxes) or 12% 
(with taxes that were paid) per annum return on the pur-
chase price was not unconscionable nor unreasonable. In 
the case at bar the total $8687.41 paid is but 10.3% per 
annum return of the $14,000 purchase price for six years, 
and of the $4687.41 paid respondents on the $10,000 "loan" 
it is but 7.8% per annum return on what respondents had 
in the deal. The $4000 paid of the $8687.41 was paid to the 
original seller, P. K. Nielson (R. 33-34). Hence, under ap-
pellants' own theory of the case, there was no penalty. 
In the Complaint respondents asked for such relief as 
may be equitable and just. The court adopted the findings 
of the jury and applied the iaw regarding the issues of this 
case (R. 96) . The first lease called for the payment of $80 
rent per month for one year and the payment of the $889.41 
delinquency remaining under the terminated real estate con-
tract, making a total amount due for the year of $1849.41 
(R. 14) . The jury found that under this first lease the ap-
pellants paid $1440.00, plus the taxes, insurance premium 
and attorney's fee as required (R. 63). (The $100 attor-
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ney fee should not be included in the $8687.41 paid on the 
transaction, as computed by appellants). The difference 
between the $1849.41 due and the $1440.00 paid is $409.41 
that was never paid by appellants. This delinquency was 
not mentioned in the second lease, and respondents did not 
sue for it specifically in the Complaint, but asked for 
amounts due under the last agreement Exhibit "C". How-
ever, it is submitted that if the penalty be allowed to stand in 
this matter, that this amount of $409.41 due under the first 
lease ·be allowed as a credit against the amount of the pen-
alty. The respondents are entitled to this amount due and 
owing from the appellants under the first lease agreement. 
As another credit, the respondents feel they are entitled 
to have appellants pay the $204.40 attorney's fees paid At-
torney Clyde D. Sandgren for services rendered regarding 
the enforcing of the second lease agreement (Plaintiffs' Ex-
hibit "E"; Jacobson's Deposition, P. 23; Swan's Deposition, 
P. 15). 
In the court's Analysis (R. 82-83) no credit was given 
for the 1952 general taxes ($93.42 plus interest) nor the 
personal property taxes attached to the property ($30.62 
plus interest) that appellants had agreed to pay under the 
second lease (Plaintiffs' Exhibits "C" and "D"). The court 
erred in not including these amounts as due respondents 
under the lease. The appellants remained in possession un-
der the lease until September 15, 1952, and were in fact in 
possession until April 11, 1953 (R. 18, 104, 122). If it be 
held that appellants were not required to pay the taxes 
while in unlawful detainer, then respondents are entitled to 
at least the proportionate amounts of these taxes up to Sep-
tember 15, 1953, or 9%-twelfths thereof. If it be held that 
the second lease was a term lease, then appellants would be 
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liable for the full amount, as the lease was not ended until 
the term expired, or five days after judgment in which les-
sees failed to pay into court the amount of the judgment. 
Brooks v. Coppedge, supra. 
Respondents also submit that the trial court was in er-
ror in limiting the amount of treble damages awarded to re-
spondents from September 15, 1952, to March 15, 1953, to 
$255.00 per month, being three times the sum of $85.00 per 
month (said $85.00 per month being the amount fixed by 
the jury as the rental value) , whereas it should have awar-
ded respondents as treble damages for said period, the sum 
of $300.00 per month, being three times the agreed rental 
of $100.00 per month, which was agreeed to by the parties 
in the second lease. Damico v. Riedel, infra; Hlarris v. Bis-
sell, 54 Cal. App. 307, 312; 202 P. 453. 
The respondents respectfully submit that there was no 
penalty involved under the facts of this case, and that the 
court erred in applying the doctrine of penalty to the mutu-
ally terminated contract of sale. It was also error not to 
credit respondents with the above amounts referred to. 
Judgment should have been awarded the respondents for 
the relief prayed for in the Complaint, together with the 
above amounts, and not subject to offset by any penalty 
claimed by the appellants. 
POINT TWO ON CROSS-APPEAL 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
TillS ACTION IS NOT BROUGHT TO ENFORCE EITHER 
EXHIBITS "A", "B" OR "C", AND THAT PIJ.AIN'l1FtFS 
ARE NOT E·NTITLED TO ANY JUDGiv.IENT WHATSO-
EVER FOR ATrORNEYS FEES. 
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In the court's Analysis attorney's fees were not allowed 
respondents "in the offset against the penalty." Reasonable 
attorney's fees had been set by the jury at $500 (R. 84, 64). 
The reason given for the disallowance was that the agree-
men sued under had been cancelled by the notice to quit of 
August 12, 1952, and that the suit brought thereupon was 
not to enforce the agreemnt but only to enforce rights there-
under. The case of Forrester v. Cook, supra, was cited 
therein as authority that a suit in unlawful detainer was not 
an action on the contract, and that therefore no attorney's 
fees are allowable as provided in the contract. 
The case at bar is different from the case of Forrester 
v. Cook, supra, where a contract of sale of real estate was 
terminated and unlawful detainer brought for treble dam-
ages against the purchasers, the court allowing the forfeit-
ure of all payments made on the contract. Since the court 
allowed the damages as provided in the contract, the only 
question that remained being for summary possession of the 
property. In the instant case the Complaint asked for ac-
cruals under the terms of the lease, restitution of premises, 
and treble damages for unlawful detainer. The court re-
fused to allow the forfeited damages as provided for in the 
contract that had been mutually terminated by the parties 
(R. 80), but instead allowed the counterclaim of defendants, 
appellants, and awarded to them a penalty judgment at the 
same time allowing to plaintiffs the accruals due under the 
second lease, as prayed for in the Complaint, and under 
which lease the court said the rights of the parties should 
be determined (R. 42, 82, 83) . 
It should be noted that the ·court speaks of the amounts 
of taxes, accrued rents, insurance premium, and water as-
sessment due respondents as an offset against the penalty 
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(R. 83-84), inferring that the plaintiffs were allowed an off-
set and not affirmative judgment. The court must then feel 
that a suit to collect accruals under a lease is not enforcii}g 
the agreement and that respondents are not therefore en-
titled to an attorney's fee. 
Unlike the Forrster v. Cook case, supra, the court in 
the instant case did not allow the forfeiture or the agree-
ment of the parties to terminate the contract to have any 
effect, and in truth allowed appellants a rescission and re-
turned the parties to the status quo. In other words the 
court did not allow recovery as provided in the contracts, 
nor as agreed by the parties. 
Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the joinder 
of causes of action and permissive Counterclaim relax great-
ly the old rules that a claim for accrued rent be not neces-
sarily joined in a possessory action in unlawful detainer and 
that a counterclaim is not permissible in an unlawful de-
tainer action. Voyles v. Straka, 77 Utah 171, 292 P. 913. 
Harris v. Bissell, 54 Cal. App. 307, 202 P. 453. White v. 
District Court, Utah, 232 P. 2nd 785. 
Where the burden of suit is thus enlarged, the provision 
for payment of attorney's fees should be more stringently 
enforced against the defaulting party. In the case at bar 
the complications involved in the action are not the fault 
nor the doing of respondents. The Complaint was filed to 
obtain possession and to collect accruals due under the lease. 
The case of Peterson v. Hodges, (1951) Utah, 239 P. 2nd 
180, 182, holds that even where a lease is surrendered and 
the landlord must sue for accruals due and owing prior to 
the surrender, attorney's fees are assessable when the lease 
provides therefor. The agreement to pay attorney's fees is 
construed as a contractual right to collect such fees as dam-
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ages arising at the same time as the obliga~ion which is sued 
upon, i. e., prior to the surrender. Even the surrender of 
a lease does not cut off this right. 
Where lessee sought rescission of lease, and where les-
sor cross-complained for rents due where lease provided at-
torney's fees in event suit brought to collect rents due there-
under, it was held lessor entitled to attorney's fees on suit 
to enforce the payment of rents. Kulawitz v. Pacific Wood-
enware and Paper Co., (1943) Calif., 142 P. 2nd 50. 
Where lease provided that lessees would pay reason-
able attorney's fees to lessors in event it became necessary 
to bring an action under the lease, lessors were entitled to 
rcover attorney's fees in accordance with provisions of the 
lease in an unlawful detainer action. Damico v. Riedel, Cal. 
App., 212 P. 2nd 52. 
Under appellants' theory of the case, they do not want 
any of the contracts enforced, but to obtain damages as pen-
alty. They are not enforcing any of the agreements, nor 
have they attempted to do so. The appellants have been al-
lowed to counterclaim for damages, and the respondents 
are attempting to enforce the lease agreements against them, 
and respondents sought possession and rents accrued, and 
taxes, and insurance premiums, and water assessment. The 
action was necessarily one to enforce the lease agreements. 
It is re~pectfully submitted that it was error for the court 
to deny respondents a reasonable attorney's fee. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent~ have answered Point Four on page 21 of 
this Brief. 
Tt1e quotatio~s from the Restatement of the Law o{ .-
Property quoted by appellants on page 26 of their brief is ' 
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merely recitative of the law stated in the case of Leone v. 
Zuniga, supra. The right to remove appellants as tenants 
at will was a "power of termination" which was an ability 
to produce a change in the given legal relation by giving the 
notice of termination. The interest subject to such a power 
of termination is terminated by any appropriate manifesta-
tion upon the part of the person in whose favor the condi-
tion exists, of his intent thereby to terminate the interest 
in question. American Law Institute Restatement of the 
Law of Property, Par. B of Sec. 24, Sec. 3, and Introductory 
Note to Chapter 4, page 118. The notices given were pro-
per to divest the appellants of any term tenancy they may 
have had as provided in the condition subsequent of the sec-
ond lease. 
Respondents respectfully request this Court to deter-
mine that the real estate contract was rightfully and mutu-
ally terminated by agreement of the parties; that any pen-
alty, if any, was waived by agreement of the parties, namely, 
the two leases, and by breaches thereof; that there is no 
penalty in this case and the rule in Perkins v. Spencer does 
not apply herein; that no valid tender of payments has been 
made, or if made at any time, such tender has been waived 
by appellants; that the notices to quit are good; that assum-
ing that they were not good, that appellants have waived 
noti·ce and any damage resulting from such failure, if any, 
by their failure to apply to the court for relief under 78-36-
10, U. C. A., 1953, and by their acts and conduct in failing 
to post a stay bond in this case and by voluntarily surrender-
ing the premises in dispute; that this Court should award 
respondents the amounts prayed for in the Complaint and 
the amounts mentioned herein under Point One on Cross 
Appeal; award respondents a reasonable attorneys fee; deny 
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appellants any attorneys fee or costs; that respondents be 
awarded their .costs and such further relief as may be just. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MORGAN AND PAYNE, 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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